The Kill Zone: Drone Warfare & Brigade Autonomy — Rob Lee & Dmytro Putiata (Pt 2)

Hi, it's Sam Cook, and welcome back to another episode of the Ukraine Military History podcast. This is part two of a two-part conversation. The first episode was a couple episodes back, our first release of the analytical series on the current war, which is The First Draft of History by Rob Lee and his colleague, Dmytro Pudiata. So this conversation continues where they left off, where they talked about the big reforms that Ukraine has made to stabilize the line, why 2026 is looking better and better, if you can go back and listen to that whole episode. But this episode also goes into what exactly is the frontline evolving into, because this is constantly changing. What is the kill zone? How big is that kill zone now? It's been expanding from just a couple kilometers to 5, 10, 15, even 20 kilometers now on the front lines. And how is Russia and Ukraine adapting to this new battlefield reality, and what are the prognosis for 2026? They also look back at one of the last big scares on the front line for Ukraine, a major breakthrough at Dobropillia and how Ukraine dealt with that and what lessons they learned from this. So this is the second in a two-part series, again, of the current analytical situation filmed as of May 2026. This First Draft of History from our top Ukraine war analysts, Rob Lee and Dmytro, who both, obviously, are here in Kiev, go to the front lines regularly. They'll be doing future episodes like this. Rob's actually going out to the front line and will be back to record some more episodes in June of 2026 about the current situation. So I look forward to you soaking in the second part of this series, understanding The First Draft of History with our top Ukraine military history war analysts, Rob Lee and Dmytro. Before we start this episode, I just wanted to make a quick word to mention our sponsors. I'm going to give you a brief introduction for our sponsors, and then at the end of the show, we'll do a longer discussion about each sponsor and what we're offering so that you can get right into the content. So this podcast is funded by the Borderlands Foundation. The Borderlands Foundation is a foundation that I established to make sure Ukraine's heroes are never forgotten, and we have two main centers that are, in effect, the sponsor of this podcast. The first center is the Ukraine Military History Institute. It's an -speaking and speaking center, which is our mission is to translate Ukraine's history from into for the world to consume and learn from. Ukraine has a lot of allies who've supported it. Almost all of them, the common language of military officers, military historians, and professionals is , so the Ukraine Military History Institute created and sponsors this. And I'll tell you all about our programs and how you can support the institute at the end of the episode. The second sponsor for this podcast is the Ukraine Center for Traumatic Stress. This is also part of the Borderlands Foundation. It's a center dedicated to research and raising awareness and helping to bring into Ukraine cutting edge therapies, treatments, protocols, and education related to post-traumatic stress disorder. The heroes of Ukraine that are fighting this war, whether they're Ukrainians or foreigners who've come in to fight side by side with Ukrainians, they're writing this history, which creates the stories, which creates a strong future country, and those memories have costs, so we're dedicated to helping advance the research, treatment, and breakthrough that all soldiers, veterans can have dealing with and overcoming post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health that arises from their service. And then finally, our last sponsor is the Borderlands Group. This is a for-profit company that donates the money to fund the Borderlands Foundation and all of our programs. I'm also the founder and president of that organization, and we do military advisory, advisory for defense companies working inside Ukraine, and consulting and software development and technical work for both governments and military defense companies. So with that, that's our sponsors. At the end of the podcast, I'm going to tell you a lot more about each sponsor if you're looking for ways that you can contribute to the Borderlands Foundation, our two centers, or if you'd like to work with myself, Rob, and other contributors for this podcast. I'll talk to you about how you can get in touch with us through the Borderlands Group for that.

I will come back to this Ukraine drone line, if you don't mind. You mentioned that we're going to build... We had this idea to build- ... kill zone, zero to 15 kilometers. Makes sense. No doubts. But the point is that I was a part of the brigades who was part of this initiative. But the thing is that no one told us what does it mean and how to create this. No one knew it. Okay, you have these nice two words. Kill zone. Fine. Sounds great. It seems like that UK, okay, you're going to destroy artillery here- ... surprise their logistics. Sounds logical, fine- ... but how to do this? How to implement? What kind of drones to use? What is the better way to use it? And the point is that we still don't have it. The point is that those unmanned system brigades, they're fighting their own wars- ... based on experience of their brigade, regiment or whatever, battalion commander. It's a big issue. While Russians tried to create something, unfortunately, we didn't, at least for the last year. And what Russians forgot, and maybe one of the reasons they failed near Kupiansk, is that they divided the areas of responsibility, which is absolutely righteous way of doing, but only for reconnaissance and striking. What they missed is area's responsibility of detection and interception because you need to combine 40 warfare, riders, interceptor crews, which and software. Which is... Right now they have it, but still. Last year they didn't have it. And in that case, you may say, "Okay, I am able to do strikes and I am able to protect other forces." They didn't do it, which shows that we are able to do it right now, at least due to some kind of structure. Because it's developing. But the point is that even if it's developing, which is absolutely understandable, you still need to have something and then you need to probate, use it and see, okay, this was wrong, this was good. This thing was absolutely right from our side, we need to scale it. I think Russians are doing this. This year I think we will see drone line version 2.0- ... where they will include this interceptor system and maybe divide this area responsibility a little bit in a different way. And the point is that even due to the structure of a brigade, we have a drone company in a lot of cases. Drone company per battalion and a separate UAV battalion per brigade. It allows you to strike quite deep. You don't need to have SBS Ukraine forces or anything like that. You just need to have proper financial support and human resources inside of these maneuver brigades. Because if your maneuver battalion has UGV platoon, US, UAV company, also interceptor crews, it means that your battalion is autonomous and does not require help even from this UAV battalion and the brigade command. While your UAV battalion and the brigade command should focus on deeper strikes with Ukraine darts, with American Hornet, with D3, D4- ... kind of drones and other type of drones. But instead of that we have something on paper and we are asking for the support for these Unmanned Systems Force brigades, which is a little bit weird and not really, in my humble opinion, the right way of doing.

And this is one of the, again, this is one of the key considerations and it's really important also for foreign militaries who want to learn from this. More about-

Yeah, absolutely.

... what structural changes make sense? And I think it's important to keep in mind why explaining to people outside, Unmanned Forces as a branch, I think it makes sense to Ukraine in some respects. I-

In some respect. Maybe much, much, much lower, but yeah.

I have a mixed view. I think it made sense in that you need somewhere to develop drone capabilities, you need to make a priority, you need a hub for R&D, other things, right? As a separate branch that has operational level concerns, I don't know it's as beneficial in that respect. And there's a lot of redundancy you see between... In Ukraine where you have a lot of units doing deep strike, a lot of units doing naval drones, and there's a lot of things where the competition is not always as helpful.

Yes.

I think it would be more efficient elsewhere. But I do think it makes some sense in that for Western militaries, the US military is obviously a very strong air component, it has a lot of other capabilities that are unique. Drones should be part of this, but they should be, it should be seen as here is a thing that augments, complements existing capabilities, right? It's not something that this is going to change everything right away, and I don't think we need to look at it that way. I don't think we should procure drones for the sake of procuring drones. We procure them when it makes our units more lethal, more effective and more flexible, right? And how it looks for the US military is going to be different from the Ukraine military. Many of Ukraine's structural adaptations have happened since 2023. So when Ukraine has been on the defense basically this entire time, strategically on the defense, obviously they've had some offensive operations. So many brigades are, and the drone era had been basically on defense. Adaptations have been for a defensive military. And a lot of armaments and forces is really focused on... The plans are well known, but basically killing as many Russians as possible, inflicting unsustainable losses until Russia just cannot continue the war essentially, right? That's not always tied to maneuver though. Whereas- ... the US military, everything is fires... Fires by itself is never... The purpose is always fires plus maneuver. How does it enable maneuver? And a lot of units and operations, it's more about we're going to try to kill as many Russians as possible and there may not be any maneuver component to it, which again, as part of the strategy for war, that makes sense, but it would not necessarily make sense for the militaries. But also in some cases some units got moved to one direction for bureaucratic reasons, for political reasons. There's always internal jockeying between different- ... different branches of the military that one wants to be stronger than another one. And so they create redundant capabilities and for deep strike, again, you have 04, you have SBU, you have unmissed forces all doing deep strike. There are multiple units in unmissed force doing deep strike.

And middle strike.

Sorry, SO is also doing deep strike. I'm sure we'll find new things doing deep strike later because everyone wants to be involved in it, right? Because again, and it makes sense. Everyone wants to have a role in undermining Russia's potential to wage the war. But it would be much more efficient probably when you have one organization dedicated to this mission.

I fully agree with you because right now everyone is doing what he thinks is right. What... Sorry, what looks sexy- ... because oil refineries are burning. It looks nice- ... but no one is asking about the efficiency and how it was implemented. So I think that a big lesson for NATO and outside NATO countries is to, first of all, to learn as much as possible what Ukraine and Russia are doing and then to think how to implement something from that war into their armies. Because this war showed and taught us that you can fight not just with 200 grands, High Mars missile. You can have much cheaper drones and they will do the same. And it requires to think a lot about how you're going to fight in the future. So this year, I got this idea that drones definitely should be part of the ecosystem. Not something separate. And if you have modern aviation, not Soviet, post-Soviet or whatever. It should also be some capabilities for aviation where they do combined strikes against the targets where those deep strike so-called deep strike drones will be part of this system which will be combined with missiles- ... ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and will hit one target more effectively, and will destroy and not just target, for example. So this is one of the key things for Western, just other countries to understand how to use drones- ... as part of their ecosystem together alongside with artillery, tanks and et cetera, because drones are not absolute. Unfortunately, we have just two totally different but, let's say undiplomatically wrong, views where drones will destroy and do everything and- ... where drones dislike for not developed countries where we're going to fight in a different way. I absolutely agree with the fact that other countries, other nations will find a different way. Sure. But the point is that you cannot, in my opinion, right now ignore drones, detection and protection from it.

Absolutely. And we're seeing this in Lebanon now with the Israeli Defense Forces- ... having difficulty with Hezbollah and Hezbollah FPV teams are, they're like-

Not even close to what-

They're operating on a 2023 level-

... Ukraine and Russia. Right? So far, far less sophisticated in terms of quality, quantity, training, experience. It's demonstrating that the IDF is having problems and if they're having problems, I think it's pretty safe to say a lot of NATO militaries would have the same problems too.

And we see this in training exercises when Ukraine teams go and operate with NATO countries. All right. I want to get back on schedule 'cause we've gone on a bunch of tangents, but I want- ... I want to make two points though. One is when we talk about structural changes that are relevant, I think it's really important to keep in mind too is that if... Both sides are creating counter UAS teams and by counter UAS teams, this is the wrong terminology. I'm not just saying teams that destroy, intercept UAVs, but teams that hunt down opposing UAV teams, right? And so Rubicon was doing this, right, and Ukrainians has companies doing this too. But right now, the focus is to put... given UAS capabilities so it's drone on drone. But in many cases, artillery is actually maybe the most effective or one of the most effective things as well as aviation, right, to knock out these positions because drones are effective, but many drones struggle to really penetrate blindages, bunkers, so on. You need something heavier. And there is a question of whether or not... If you want to create a unit like a company in a brigade, right, just for countering UAV teams, hunting UAV teams, it probably needs to be a combination of ISR, some strike, right? FPV, maybe bomber, and then maybe one or two Howitzers, right? And the combination effects is the ideal way of really countering UAV teams. But that is a structural change that I think will come slowly, but it is interesting how to think through this.

Yeah, it's combined arms, good morning. Nothing happened, just the drone appeared as an extra tool. As extra opportunity and excess threat. But yeah, I fully agree. When I was a battle captain, during the last summer, I had to counter Howitzers. And the problem is that if you use only drones against a Howitzer, even if it's a simple one to two. Good morning, but they're able to shut down. They're able to jam it. They're able to create a protection. And the point is that I had to use artillery quite a lot. And only together with artillery, it was the most efficient way to destroy- ... or successfully suppress artillery. Not just drones and not just artillery. For me, we usually use six to eight rounds, which is not a lot. But with the help of ISR- ... we show all the shells that detonated near the target. They correct... Okay, they did mess. As artillery men do it. And we use drones, different type of drones, high explosive cumulative ammo. Just to destroy the critical system of the artillery piece. And the same with drone operators. They can have nets, they can have electronic warfare, they can shoot down. They can intercept your fiber drone with another drone or whatever. You cannot rely only on drones, at least right now. Or just only on artillery. Right now we have a lot of assets and capabilities and threats. So you need to understand how to use them properly and effectively. I agree.

And okay. I'm going to go back to what we were doing before a little bit to try and keep us on track 'cause we went on tangents. Good tangents, but- So all right. Let's go back to 2025, right? So I think Doropilia in August is an important case study on what's going to happen this year when we look at what happened last year in Doropilia, right? And so August 2025, maybe the most serious moment on the battlefield last year. The Russians had a really deep infiltration. It was east of Doropilia, where they made it, in some cases, 18 kilometers or more past the front line. In some cases, they're just walking for three or four days, just walking the whole time. Some groups, the deepest they got was to Petrivka, this little village right north of the road between Kramatorsk and Doropillya. Some soldiers also got within three kilometers of Doropillya itself, so they got pretty close to the city. It was a really significant moment. It got a lot of attention because Deep State did this update where they showed this is the bunny ears where it was a really significant change and created a big media effect and so on. I went down to the area a week or two afterwards, tried to find out what happened. Basically, what happened that summer is emblematic of challenges Ukraine had in 2025. So, there was a new brigade that had been in this direction for some time, and that brigade had been pushed back pretty consistently in this time, and it was difficult for Ukraine's defenses to hold because this is the weak point line. One of the issues that happened in 2024 to 2025, Ukraine built a bunch of new brigades. When they got deployed, for different reasons, they had issues of their initial combat experience. Sometimes the commanders were guys who had come from other places that did not have combat experience. They did not have the drone component because it was not part of the TONE. So they deployed. But a lot of brigades, maybe half the drones they get are from nonprofits, charities, so on. These new brigades had none of that support because they didn't have the background. When they deployed, they lacked a lot of the drone component. Some of them had some big AWOL issues before this, and when they deployed initially, they had some real big issues of coordinating, of fighting, of how to do this. They got thrown into the fight way too early sometimes. In other cases, as a brigade was forming, they'd form one battalion. That battalion would then be attached to some other brigade because you needed to respond to what was going on in 2024. So the formation of the brigades was often quite flawed, and they had some big issues. What happened in 2024 is emblematic of some of these challenges, so that one of the brigades was struggling. They kept getting pushback. Ukraine pulled another brigade to replace it. That brigade had fought most of the war piecemeal, as different battalions and had done very well. They're respected battalions, but they'd not operated cohesively as a brigade. And one of the issues, and this is also an issue of what happened in 2024, is that quite often when Russians would advance in one direction, Ukraine would pull up a battalion or company from a brigade, send it to a different part of the frontline, and attach it to a different brigade. This created all sorts of problems because this brigade would abuse that battalion because it's not their own. They wanted to save their own battalions. And of course, they'd go to a different part of the frontline, they don't know the people, they don't know how to coordinate very well, where piecemeal deployments are generally a problem. So this brigade, where the deep infiltration happened, or part of it happened, basically what I had heard was that when they came back to fight as a cohesive brigade, they had some real challenges because they'd just not done this. They'd always fought as separate battalions, and then fighting together as a brigade, they had some real challenges initially, coordination issues. There's also some big adjacent unit problems. This has also been a consistent issue where brigades don't always talk to each other properly. There isn't necessarily coordination between each other. And the last one, which is an issue that's been a problem for a while, is that when there are issues, brigades won't always acknowledge what's happening. So, if they lose a position, the commanders at different levels will get relieved if they lose positions. And in some cases, they'll be ordered to counterattack to retake a position. They lost it because they don't have enough people, and then counterattacking is not going to succeed. So sometimes commanders have gotten into the habit of not acknowledging losing a position because either they don't want to get relieved, or they don't want to turn down a counterattack order they know is not going to succeed. This has become a problem where two units, adjacent units, want to lose a position. That adjacent unit will get attacked from the side, where they thought they had friendlies, and they'll be, "What's going on here?" That is an issue they're having before. Some of the advance to 2024, some of the towns that they advanced in, this is one of the problems that happened. Basically, you had these internal issues, and this might have been a contributing factor to some extent during this thing too. Infiltration happens. Ultimately, the Russians were surprised. They got further than they thought they would. They didn't have a force to exploit it. They did get a lot of guys through. What I was told was maybe 200, 250, 300 guys a week later were in this area. They didn't bring up armor, though. They weren't able to bring up capabilities. They'd moved beyond the range of which UAVs could support them. So then, when Ukraine responded, Ukraine brigades who responded brought up armor. So 93rd Mechanized Brigade, they had to pull the reconnaissance battalion. They also pulled up a lot of UGVs and used UGVs in an offensive way. But a lot of the counterattack was tanks because, again, it was 20 kilometers from what the frontline had been. Russia did infiltrate MAVIC teams with them, but they were not bringing up FPV teams the same way, Molniya teams, so on. So tanks could operate again effectively, and they did a good job. Tanks can still be quite effective when you set conditions. 93rd Brigade also used UGVs in offensive ways. They'd bring up UGVs with machine guns. Basically, they could, because they couldn't pull their own battalions off the front lines to respond, send a UGV into a village first. Then if any Russians shoot at the UGV, you can kill them with UAVs. It's a movement to contact, essentially. Some of the UGVs were used to try and burn down tree lines where they thought Russians were, so they could drop gasoline, light it on fire with a tracer. Interesting new tactics. But the response was, Ukraine redeployed 1st Azov Corps, so the corps took over responsibility for the sector. They redeployed a bunch of unmissed forces units that were there, special reagents units, some assault units, so on. So Ukraine was able to stabilize it and then basically to push back Russia across this area. I think it was important because it showed the problems that Ukraine had faced before. It showed that Ukraine was still able to hold it once they reinforced. After this infiltration occurred, this became Russia's big plan for 2025. So they pulled all the naval infantry brigades, almost all of them from Sumy, from Kherson. They focused in that one direction. Naval infantry brigades also had, in some cases, 90% of their equipment- ...still remaining, way above what was normally the case. They redeployed a bunch of Rubicon units too. Rubicon reinforced sector two. Russia made this big priority. The old operational goal was to encircle Слов'яно-Съединеные Краматорски. So from Omel, then from Doropillya, and try and connect in Bohdanivka. This is the big success. Center Group of Forces also had a significant amount of assets applied. Eighth Combined Arms Army was part of Center Group of Forces, even though it's typically part of southern military district. 68th Army Corps was also attached to it as well. It's a really big priority of FPV teams, of Rubicon, of naval infantry, so on. Yet it didn't succeed, and I think this is one of the more important things to talk about for 2026. It didn't succeed for a few different reasons. One of the reasons is that when the naval infantry got redeployed, 51st Combined Arms Army lied to the naval infantry, telling them where the frontline was.

Classic.

Very classic problem that military still has. There's a village called Rubizhne, northeast of Doropillya. During this deep infiltration, the Russians got near Rubizhne, but didn't hold it. When the naval infantry guys redeployed in September, October, the bunny ears had been cut off by Ukraine units. You still had a pocket there, but it was cut off. The frontline really was down by Nova Toretsk area. The naval infantry guys were told Rubizhne was held by 51st Combined Arms Army. The real frontline was maybe 10 kilometers away. The first mechanized assault, they were told completely wrong direction, and the first assault was defeated quite easily by UAVs and so on. But the lying was a big contributing factor here, where they didn't know the frontline was. They were deployed, and the navy actually lost a lot of people in this initial assault, which they couldn't afford to lose. That was a big contributing factor. But in general, when Ukraine deployed its own reinforcements, its unassisted forces units, its best drone units, its other capabilities, and Russia did the same, it demonstrated that Ukraine can still hold. This was not sufficient for Russia to overcome those defenses. Their approach of last year of reinforcing Rubicon, deploying their best naval units, this combination did not lead to success. I think that's a really important thing to keep in mind for 2026, that a breakthrough is not particularly likely this year for Russia. They tried it. The best chance for this was last year. It didn't succeed, and there are some different reasons why the situation is better for Ukraine now. That's why I think maybe a breakthrough is less likely. Doropillya is a useful case study in examining what went wrong for Ukraine. Some of those things have been fixed or improved upon, and some of the issues are still there.

When Russians captured Avdiivka- ...in 2024, I noticed how they, at a strategic level, changed their approach. They were quite easily able to take their forces from one direction and move them to another. They had this adaptivity to the situation. That they didn't have before. It seems when they managed to break through this Doropillya direction, they didn't plan it initially to make it. It seems they have this tactics of infiltration. And if it goes, it goes. It seems this is how I see it, maybe for this critical, maybe one week, maybe five days, maybe 10 days- ...for this critical period of time, they even didn't believe that it happened. So it took them too much time to redeploy those fresh forces- ...fully equipped with manpower and- ...vehicles, to deploy them from Sumy and from Kherson direction to Doropillya. They literally lost this time opportunity. I think it's one of the reasons they fail. You mentioned that they are lying. They have this way of approaching where they say, "Okay, we already captured those villages." But they did not. They are telling their superior commands that, "We hold position in these villages." So superior command saying, "Okay, if you hold these villages, you need to advance from these villages to that direction, to that direction." "Is it okay?" "Yeah, sure." Then division commanders thinking, "Okay, if I need to advance from these villages, but I'm not there, maybe I literally need to do it-" ...to capture that." Then they go trying to capture it, and they're failing and dying. The problem is that this superior command does not really understand what kind of forces they operate. The quality of these forces is, in a lot of cases, in terms of infantry, not as it used to be years ago. Same is with Ukraine. That's an unfortunate natural way of doing during wartime, so you have this degradation. But the perception of the war from generals is far from the reality. They do not really understand how it's going on the ground. That's why they tell them, "Okay, you need to capture this tree line till 31st of May." "You need to do it." So, battalion regiment commander understands, it's not doable but I was forced. They're trying to do that and they suffer a lot of losses because of that. They don't have proper planning, they don't have reconnaissance, they don't have concentration of fire. That's why they are not able to break through.

And that's, lying is a problem in both militaries. It's a bigger problem in the military, but it is a problem in Ukraine military too. But in these cases, this is one example of how lying created a big problem, and after that happened, 51st Commander Arms Army commander was relieved. They had an FSB investigation about what happened, and they fired him. Ultimately, it comes from the top. Putin consistently gives the military unreasonable objectives. Obviously from the beginning, but even now, they get demands that are just unreasonable. Generals down below the command basically have to execute those orders. They'll say, "Yes, we'll do this," and then as the orders go down the command, they have a timeline. If you don't meet that timeline, you'll get replaced, so you incentivize guys to lie, as you said. They take villages on credit. They say, "Oh, we took this village." They didn't take it. Or it incentivizes flag showing things, where either a drone drops a flag to show they took something or they send guys forward who are going to be killed just to plant a flag. A Maverick shows up and then the guys who get killed, they don't hold anything. They're unnecessarily losing people, but also in order to overcome Ukraine's defenses, you have to do proper planning. It's true on both sides. Both sides, if you want to do an offensive that succeeds, you have to take time, do a deliberate plan, find a weak point on the line, degrade the defenses there for a period of time, do rehearsals, do some cohesive training, and you have to have very good execution. Ukraine, there are criticisms of assault units, so sometimes they do counterattacks before those conditions are there, and they lose people because they have not set conditions for using armor. Russians do that all the time too. In the case of the infantry, some of these assaults, the infantry weren't even doing suppression. They were just really significant failures, and I think it was a big command issue for them. But I think this is still a really significant vulnerability for Russia, where their adjacent unit coordination also is quite bad. In Kupyansk, you had two regiments, one was in the city, one was north of the city. Those two regiments were not talking to each other. When Ukraine did its counterattack, the regiment that was getting pushed back north of the city did not tell the guys in the city anything was happening. And then suddenly, the guys in the city started getting killed and they're like, "What's happening? We didn't see this coming." But it is a vulnerability where Ukraine can do offensive operations and if they attack between the seam of two units, the two units are probably not talking very well. They're probably lying to each other and it creates real vulnerabilities. So, I think it's a really significant thing, but I think so, talking all about 2025, right? We come back and try to put it back to where we are now. So Russia's approach, right? Infiltration, development, development of Rubicon, improved drone employment, the drone line initiative, really understanding that drones are a key part of this war. That led to a faster rate of advance in 2025 than 2024, right? And I forget the numbers exactly, but they advanced at a faster rate. Did not achieve a breakthrough, but they are taking more territory as you go. So we get to this winter, right? And again, last November, October, Russia got into Pokrovsk, right? They had the battle for Pokrovsk, Milorad, right? They'd taken both cities, essentially, at this point. We get to 2026, right? So seasonal dimension, Russia typically advances slower in the winter than they do in summertime. And so now, we're approaching summer. The seasonal changes, weather changes should provide a greater advantage to offensive operations than the winter does. But I do think the reasons why I think I'm more optimistic now than last year this time and why I think Russia's going to have more difficulty advancing this year than last year is that there's a number of things that are different, right? So Ukraine has adapted to infiltration, right? So brigades know how to deal with infiltration. They've repurposed reconnaissance units, they've repurposed soft and so on to focus on counter-infiltration, right? Infantry know that you'll have guys behind you, you can still hold your position as long as you're being resupplied properly. Ukraine has developed logistic system for UGVs, UAVs that can sustain infantry even with infiltration. Ukraine has also learned to deal with Rubicon, right? So they learned to deal with strikes behind the front line, deal with the kill zone, how to walk a certain amount, how to do logistics, and so on. They've figured it out. They figured out how to maintain your UAV capabilities even as you're getting targeted, right? So the Russians are targeted with CAVs, artillery, and so on. So for all those reasons, I think Russia's approach, their approach in 2025 was an improvement over 2024, but did not lead to success, or not significant success. Now the question is, what is Russia going to do this year? 'Cause if they keep applying the same approach, you'll see diminishing returns, most likely, right? And I think they have to adapt in some way. And as you said before, right, 155th Division is determining if infiltration is not achieving the results they need, they need to go back to using armor, but for armor, you need to set conditions for using armor. It's not impossible, although it is a big question, can Russia do it at this point, right? Given issues with lying, with unrealistic political objectives, with inability to coordinate, adjacent unit problems, control issues.... can they actually set conditions to sufficiently degrade, suppress Ukraine UAV positions on a certain part of the frontline to enable maneuver, right? And also part of maneuver, too, involves you really need interceptor teams that are effective and you have to use interceptors as offensive counter error.

I fully agree. Same with other type of drone operators, or at least other capabilities to launch drones. Right now, with technologies, you are able to launch drones from Kyiv- ... and you will take part in this maneuver offensive which is, I don't know, you put a box, you open the box and FPVs start flying. It's doable. We will see a lot of things like that quite soon. So, yeah, I'm also quite optimistic. We will see, as we said multiple times, a lot of good presence- ... for us, for Western society, yeah, and we will show that maneuvers are possible during this deadlock drone warfare situation.

Right. So yeah, I think there's two main factors that influence the battlefield, right? There is the relative manpower situation and then the relative drone employment situation, right? So from manpower, this has been Ukraine's big challenge for a while, right? We know that brigades are undermanned. They're well below table organization strength. There's not enough infantry, there's not enough people in different positions. When Fedorov took over as Minister of Defense, when he mentioned publicly that there was 200,000 people who were AWOL in the military, two million people who were avoiding mobilization, this remains the big challenge of, there's a significant number of people going AWOL every month, we know this. Mobilization, the numbers have increased since they were a year ago, but obviously a significant number of people go AWOL and desert from the training centers right away. Other people desert because they get exhausted and they don't get rotated. I would say though, I think what we've seen recently though, is that there's been a slight positive development in the manpower situation at the front, where brigade is still undermanned, but I think they've increased their numbers slightly, right? It's the first time we've seen improvement in a long time in the war for the manpower side for Ukraine. And I think on the side... So Russia still has a lot of people and the plan for this year is I think there were 409,000 people, I think that's what horror said. And last three years, they exceeded their quotas, right? They recruited more than 400,000. I think last year was, I think it was around the same number and they met that-

Close to that, quite close to that.

... and they met their quota in the beginning of December, right? So they succeeded. Thus far this year, they're having issues though, right? And so they're not exceeding the number so far. Obviously we know a lot of people volunteer because of significant financial benefits, right? Which is money that a lot of people can never see otherwise in small towns. Many people also get coerced in serving, so either prisoners get coerced into serving or police are giving quotas of a certain number of people they want to get contracts per month, and they're incentivized financially to do this, but they can also go to people and just say, "Okay, we're going to put you in jail for something, we're going to make up a charge, or you can sign a contract," and they coerce them to serve. So that's still a key component. They want to, I think they want to recruit 20,000 foreigners as well, they're probably not going to meet that quota this year. They're probably having more problems I think recruiting foreigners now. But Russia traditionally has met their numbers. I think thus far they're struggling to meet their number, but I think what's... I mean, the relative situation, I think this year they're probably going to have more difficulty recruiting the numbers they had in previous years. They can still do offensive operations, they're still going to get more people than Ukraine will, I think, but Russia depends on a significant manpower advantage to really advance, right? And if that advantage decreases, then the rate of advance is probably going to decrease as well, they could probably do offenses in fewer directions at a time, less likely to achieve a breakthrough, and probably create some other issues. Do you think that's roughly the right way of looking at it?

Yeah, I agree, because if this recruitment system, sorry, this recruitment campaign they have right now continues in the same pace they have right now till the end of the year, they will have a gap from 15% till 17%. So it's going to be the first years that didn't manage to recruit- ... the needed amount of people. And this recruitment is needed also to fulfill gaps that were provided by the losses- ... during the fights and you also need to create and reform new units for that. So I think they will face these issues. We already mentioned today that they have a problem with recruiting students. Apart from that, they have problems right now with recruiting just-

And for students, it's a one-year contract to join NATO's forces.

Yeah, allegedly one year 'cause everyone else- Yeah, I mean, yeah, one year, but it sounds quite not bad- ... because you're going to be a millionaire. I mean, it's a-

Very lucrative financially.

Yeah, I mean, it was rubles, but still millionaire, and-

But the idea is people who are in university take one year out of university, come back. Now, everyone else who signs a contract, you are in the military until the war ends basically.

I think so.

... they say this is a different deal for these guys, they probably have a good reason not to believe this is the case, but some of them have signed up, but you said the numbers are far below what they are hoping for, and in particular, they need to get talent, they need to get the technologically savvy Russians, young Russians to serve in these units and if they don't get it, they're just not going to have the same innovation level, right? It's just not going to be possible.

Yeah, as Ukrainians- ... have. But, yeah.

You were talking about units being formed. What units did they try and form last year? And what units are they trying to form this year and how did that go?

Well, for the last year, they tried to mostly reform- ... existing units from brigades or from regiments into divisions in 80%, 85, they failed to do that- ... because of huge losses. Despite the fact that they managed to fulfill the quota of recruitment but they still didn't manage to do these reforms.

It's typically to elevate a brigade to a division, right? That's for the most part. Also, there are three corps they wanted to make armies.

Yeah, from, mostly from Leningrad Military District to... ... to make them combine arms. Which also requires quite a lot of resources and unfortunately for us, Russians are not doing the same mistakes that we do. They had a chance, okay, we plan to do this, so we need to do this, but no, they face the problem with the amount of personnel, so they said, "Okay, we're not able to do this." "We're not doing this." Ukraine, unfortunately, seems like they would do on the contrary, "Okay, we plan to create fire maneuver brigades. We need to do that." And no one cares whether those maneuver brigades have 20-30% of personnel and needed equipment. Fine, we'll create a brigade. Russians didn't do it, unfortunately. For this year, they have a bit small appetite in terms of reforming, but personally for me, it was very interesting to see that they're going to rechange the most elite VDV division, or in general division, the 76th. That is the part of Leningrad Military District. It's going to be assault corps.

No army corps, oh, sorry, sorry, aerosol corps.

Yeah, aerosol corps.

Aerosol corps.

All those regiments that right now in divisions will be transformed into brigades. Brigade will consist of three battalions, UAV battalion. I mean, also UAV companies per battalions. They're going to also create reconnaissance brigade. Artillery brigade. Also will form a UAV regiment, so it's going to be quite, if they manage to do this- ... it's going to be quite efficient and strong unit.

So, it's interesting that both naval infantry and VDV are being scaled, right? So the naval infantry last year, they scaled 55th... sorry, 155th and 336 brigades- ... into the 155th and 122nd, sorry, 120-

Yeah, 120.

... 120th, 120th divisions. Now, they're not divisions, right? They're actually just, they have one regiment essentially with- ... with things. So I think there are probably 4,000 to 5,000 strong.

Yeah, I mean, despite the fact that it's only one regiment, but this regiment, for example, in five division is 4K personnel. ... which is more than average regiment- ... but still, it's definitely not a division. It's one regiment, so the question is, what was the point of doing this? I don't really understand.

But in this year, they want to scale 61st- ... and 80th into divisions too, right?

The 40th.

40th, okay.

40th. And this 61st division. Yeah, I mean, maybe they will, they will be able to do that. Maybe it's going to be again one regiment division. I don't know, it's...

But it's interesting, so naval infantry is being scaled and then VDV also. So VDV now, they already scaled brigades into divisions, right? So they have two- ... they have two brigades still, right, 11th and 83rd, because 31st became 104th division. So that already happened, and then they're continuing to scale all their components to it. Right now, the VDV has a 20th unmanned systems forces battalion as organic to VDV, and you said they're trying to scale up as well and create their own capability.

I think it's going to be a brigade- ... VDV brigade in the future.

Most likely, yeah.

And they are scaling this, the 36th separate assault regiment is going to be another VDV division. Which I know, I think it's pointless. It's- ... way too much. To have so much VDV components that they're not able to transport via helicopters- ... or planes, so it's, it's... but just a brand?

Well, I mean, again, it's a question of eliteness, right? Then it- ... then again, it is a question of to what extent is VDV naval infantry more elite than regular units at this point. There's some question there. I think it's probably an element to it, but it is interesting to see though, because they are a very key way of viewing what the military views of future warfare, what's useful, what should we be scaling, so on, what capabilities do we need. So naval infantry obviously, they're spread out across the country, so every fleet has a naval infantry component, and so they're scaling those. VDV is also the quick reaction force- ... strategic force of the military, so I think that's quite notable. So, I'll get back to the UAS side. So, give me a sec, I'm going to look through my notes. So anyway, manpower side, we covered, right? The second, I think, key faction on the battlefield is really just UAS and drone employment, right, and there's a relative thing, it's hard, there's tactical, operational, strategic, and so on. One of the reasons why I'm more optimistic now is that I think Ukraine has not just maintained but increased the upper hand on UAS, right? And so, middle strike is probably the best example. I think deep strike, the quantities are increasing for Ukraine, right? So Russia's had this advantage at the beginning of the war, Ukraine is increasingly pushing in there too. In some cases, maybe almost quantitatively launching more drones, deep strike drones in some months, we know there are some missiles that are being developed, some are missiles, there are also some foreign missiles or drone missiles, and so on. I think that part's developing quite well. Middle strike is maybe the most important development, I think, in this realm, right? Because Russia... So they've been using ground drones for operational strikes too, right? So it's some of them are strikes done by the general staff, some are operational strikes done by the group.

Also tactical.

Yes.

They also use ground types of drones against-

No, totally.

... control positions. They do.

And so they've had that advantage for a while, right? And it supplements the glide bomb, so that's always been an advantage too, but Ukraine never has had a full solution for that. And then of course, when with Molniya, with BM35, this became another issue when they started putting Starlink on them, right? And this created this really big challenge in January when, with Molniya, you had this very cheap operational drone capability, and Russia started going after the main road from Pavlohrad to Petropavlovsk, they started knocking out just regular trucks. But this became a really big threat in January. If Russia can scale operational depth strikes, it's going to be a big problem for logistics. Now of course, Starlink was cut off, and this is one of the big developments, but I think these are two of the reasons for relative optimism compared to last year, is that Ukraine is now a quite capable middle strike capability right now, whereas and you divide it into different groups, I think Fedorov, he tweeted and he... I think he termed middle strike anything from 30 to 150 kilometers past the front line. I think that was the number. I might be wrong. I would say middle strike is maybe anything more than 30 kilometers past the front line, and-

I see, so...

And I would include all the occupied areas, right? I'd say all this is operational depth, middle strike capability, right? Maybe that's wrong. I would include Crimea too. Again, maybe that's not true, but that's my view. But what I would say is, development of FP-2s is... These big kamikaze drones, 100 kilogram warheads, other things like Bulava, RAM II X, the Hornet, all that middle strike drones, some of these have small warheads that can hit a truck, but nothing bigger than that. But the quantities are increasing quite significantly, the quality is increasing too, and right now, Russia doesn't have a good answer to this, right? And we saw the last five months, a significant number of air defense systems have been hit by FP-2s or Bulava or so on, at quite significant ranges. But not just that, we're seeing hits on command posts, on warehouses, on logistics depots, on other things.

I maybe will correct a few. But I'm not sure that we are striking a lot of command posts right now. Because... That's my opinion. I have no facts, but the problem is that command posts, even battalion level- ... they are deeply underground. And honestly, with this quality of warhead flaver drones, even four FP or- ... German one, whatever drones, it's not very possible to penetrate this. Maybe that's why we are destroying so much defense systems- ... that won't be able to cover this area- ... and it means that we'll be able to use aviation more. Because if you want to destroy a regiment command post- ... you need to use British or French cruise missiles. A couple of them, at least. And then... Okay, this one is destroyed, seriously damaged or it cannot operate anymore. Maybe that's the things why we are destroying so much air defense system. Because, as I said, it's not 2022 where Russians place their HQs in restaurants and- ... two-story, three-story buildings. It's right now deeply underground, and it's quite hard to penetrate, at least with drones.

So what do you think the implications are of the middle strike campaign? What effect do you think it's going to have on the battlefield itself?

I can assume there's going to be a huge effect. We may say that will adapt to that, but the question is when and with what price. And what they will lose if they adapt? Because you cannot adapt literally to everything. For example, I mentioned air defense systems, also radar systems, like P18 radar. So it's able to cover some area- ... 60 kilometers, so it has some tasks. If you destroy it or target it... So they have two variants: to continue staying in this area plus-minus a couple of kilometers- ... and being destroyed again, or to move deep. If you move deep, you're already losing and missing something. Same with air defense. In terms of ammunition depots, fuel depots, warehouses in general, all the stuff that we are striking right now, same here. They used to place all of that at a distance of 60, 80 kilometers, which is not reachable for HIMARS. Right now, it's 120. I think we will force them to place them at least 200 kilometers from the front line, and in some cases, they're already moving those warehouses to Russia- ... where they think they have better protection. All of this helps us to win some time- ... for better preparation and their logistics suffer. Their trucks are suffering and their ammunition depots are suffering. It means that you're unable to do supplement, rotation. It requires much more time, it requires much more fuel, and fuel also is being targeted. So this will create a much broader problem for them, because sustainability of your defense, of the army, of any army, is not just about whether you're killing enemy soldiers. Maybe you are able to stop the enemy's advance, but the best thing is to combine, and we are finally combining. So, I think we'll see much more with that.

The effects again, it's... I compare it to a year ago, right? A year ago, Ukraine has always had pretty good intelligence on where targets are. Yes. And yes, other reasons for optimism is that Western support for Ukraine has gotten better, right? Because in the beginning it was, we had to create new structures entirely, the trust is not there, maybe there's still trust issues based on what some foreign politicians say in Ukraine. There still is that issue, but the connections between Western militaries, intelligence agencies and ones has improved dramatically. The targeting process become more sophisticated, the relationships have become more mature. And so, a lot of things have improved a lot. I think for middle strike and compared to a year ago, right, Russia could... Logistics were easier to operate a year ago. Just significantly easier. You can move trucks much closer to the front line. You can't do that easily now.

Approximately 20 kilometers, you are firing in a lot of cases.

And so, that's not safe anymore. So, they're going to adapt, they always do adapt, but the adaptations will make them less effective, less efficient, right? And so, they're already moving fuel back further from the front line, right? Logistics are getting moved back further from the front line. You have to use more trucks or smaller trucks or ATVs instead, right?

You need to cover them also.

So, all those things become a bigger issue. As you said, you need EW counter UAS teams, you need air defense teams. These are all guys who cannot be assault men and other things, right? To supply this. All that's going to become more difficult, and this is going to make offensive operations more difficult for Russia. But also, look, it gives better prospects for Ukraine to do offensive operations because you can try to isolate areas by doing operational strikes. You can degrade logistics in a part of the front line, and then try and isolate brigades in the front line and say, "We're going to make the logistics very difficult for this one or two brigades." And that could set conditions for successful offensive operations. Not saying Ukraine is going to drive to Crimea or that. But when you look back at what happened Kopanskoye-Huliapole, the operations were successful. They could have gone far better though, right? There were opportunities for improvement and another reason for optimism is that it demonstrates that lines are not that strong. There are vulnerabilities there.

They don't have a defense line as it used to be during summer counter-offensive in 2023. They have three different lines. Where now it's a thin line and nothing is behind, mostly.

You have the initial line of infantry, right? The infantry don't have much in the way of anti-tank weapons. And their entire concept is we have to go forward. We have a timeline we have to advance forward, right? Based on political objectives. And so, they're entirely focused on offensive. And so, the initial line are guys who are using it as a jump off position to go further, and your positions behind them, but that's dugouts to support offensive operations, not defensive. And basically, the defenses are held by UAV teams, right? It's Mavic teams, FPV teams. It's the assumption that Ukraine tries to do offensive, we can stop it with FPVs, Molniyas, Mavericks, right? If you target those teams, if you knock out logistics of those teams, if you suppress those teams, right, then the lines are not that strong. You can use armor again. You can push them back. Now, it requires planning, preparation. It requires forces, and brigades are under-manned, you have various problems. But the opportunity is there, and I think the Huliaipole operation, so obviously, Ukraine didn't take back Huliaipole. I'm saying the area that was north of Huliaipole, Ternova and so on. But it could have gone better, and it could have achieved a real breakthrough instead of a deep breach, right? And so, how do you predict what's going to happen this year? It's hard to say, of course, but I would not be surprised that Ukraine pushes back Russia in some directions. We might see a case where Russia is advancing in one direction, Ukraine is advancing in a different direction. I think the conditions are there. I think the issue of lying internal in the military is a strong vulnerability that can be exploited. I think the development of middle strike is increasing problems for Russia. I think at the end of the year... And look, there are still real risks. There are still risks that Russians are going to climb towards Slovyansk-Kramatorsk, right? They're approaching the high ground. Once they have the high ground, it becomes easier to use UAS, it becomes easier to move in that direction. That's still a big concern. It's still a big concern that forces are not far from Zaporizhia. They're not far from Kharkiv. Okay, they're not advancing on Kharkiv, but they're not far from it. And these are still problems that when the war ends at the front line is close to important cities, this is a big challenge and problem for Ukraine. And of course, we know that if Russia advances closer to Kramatorsk-Slovyansk, they'll see more FPVs, more artillery strikes, more CABs, all these things. And civilian casualties will increase, civilians will have to leave, they get forced out. So, these are the still real important considerations this year. But I would say my views, I think, there's reasons to believe the situation is better this year than it was last year, and that there's reason to believe that Russia will have more difficulties advancing this year than last year. That's my perspective. It's hard to predict things more than a few months in advance because things change- ... quite dramatically. But a couple other reasons why I'm somewhat optimistic. One is the innovation advantage. Ukraine has it. I don't think Ukraine is going to lose it. Ukraine defense companies, many of them are very new companies. They've existed for a year or two, right? Three years maybe, the drone companies. They're becoming more mature, right? So initially we have some very smart IT experts who don't have a background in business or defense- ... trying to create a product, trying to get funding, trying to get the ecosystem, right? That ecosystem is more sophisticated now. There's Western funds coming here. Western governments are doing better support too because they're doing targeted support, right? So funding a unit- ... funding a company, funding a capability. That targeted support is becoming very, very effective, and a lot of Western countries are doing a very good job in that respect. Western countries have a better understanding of Ukraine and the strengths and-

Yeah, how it works here-

Yes.

... because it's not what you do, what you have. And I just hope that they will support not just some units- ... maybe some corps. ... because army corps should have the ability to do maneuvers- ... to defend itself. Not just one- ... brigade, regiment, or battalion. So I hope it's going to happen. So the short conclusion of that is that you need to have a goal, proper planning- ... reconnaissance, and responsibility. One guy who will be responsible for the operation. Not a- ... the main guy but maybe a colonel or a brigade general or- ... And then, we know how to deal with drones. It's not just about interception. And I believe that we mentioned it today multiple times that we will see maneuvers again. It's going to happen. But please do not expect that it's going to be like Robotino 2.0. Nope. It's a much smaller way. But we will see those things that weren't done by anyone else before. We will see usage of different technologies.

And then, there's a bunch of other topics I want to get into, but we've been talking for a while, so there's a lot- ... and we'll save it for another date, but the assault forces concept, it is new, of how do you use drones, how do you fight in a drone environment, how do you do offensive operations in a drone environment, counter UAS, offensive UAS. But the system is being tinkered with and people are figuring how to do this, and units are innovating, and there's a better chance of seeing units achieve a breakthrough than units because tinkering is happening more on the side. The development's happening more despite the manpower problems. I also think that Western defense companies have finally realized Ukraine is the incubator for everything, right? If you want to test a weapon in a combat environment, you can only do it in Ukraine, right? If you want to test a UAV in a real EW environment, a peer conflict, you can only do it in Donetsk region. In particular-

Mostly there.

And even, some parts of the front line are far worse than others too. And so EW that works in, or a UAV that works in Zaporizhia may not work in Pokrovsk and elsewhere, right?

Because of frequencies and different- ... stuff.

So what we're seeing is Western defense companies who are bringing over important technology, not necessarily the system itself but a component of technology- ... that can be integrated into drones or other developments. And the combination of Western innovation is a really potent combination that Russia cannot compete with. And, you know, you've got companies that are more mature. The innovation is still there. They're being funded properly. As long as they're being funded properly, I think the innovation will continue at a pace. I don't think Russia's system could compensate in this respect. And so, there will be more adaptation cycles in this war. I just think that Ukraine is going to retain this kind of innovation advantage as we go forward. And look, I think we get to the end of the year, capabilities in middle strike and deep strike keep expanding. I think what it's going to mean is that if Russia's struggling to protect things in Crimea, right, their military facilities, their other things, at some point, Russia may be losing leverage, right? In an eventual peace deal, whatever, the frontline may move further into territory. But if Russia can't protect Crimea, then does it end the war in a stronger position? Because in the beginning of the war, Ukraine could not do anything to Crimea. And now, Crimea is repeatedly being struck by targets. Black Sea Fleet headquarters has already struggled with-

On a nightly basis.

Exactly. The Black Sea Fleet is in Novorossiysk. It's not in Sevastopol. And so, I think Russia risks overextending itself and getting into a position where, again, there's a lot of conversation about have we reached a turning point in the war, what does this turning point mean, et cetera. I'm not going to go that far. I will say that there are reasons to believe the situation is better now than it was a year ago, and there are reasons for cautious optimism about certain developments. And I think some of these things, Ukraine will maintain this advantage. And so, going into the rest of the year, I think there are reasons for optimism.

That's a very decent conclusion on what we have right now on the front line.

But we'll come back. We'll talk about some of these things in greater depth later. And, and then, we're going to continue doing longer conversations about military history topics, military, modern warfare topics, technology, a variety of other things as well.

We will try to do that at least.

All right. Good on you.

Great.

All right. Talk to you later.

See you.

So thank you for listening to this episode of the Ukraine Military History Podcast. I promised you at the beginning that I'd tell you more about our sponsors. If you'd like to find a way to support the Ukraine Military History Podcast, the Borderlands Foundation more broadly, or if you'd like to work with myself and the contributors, the editors, and the guests that come on this show. So, this podcast is produced by the Borderlands Foundation. The Borderlands Foundation has two main initiatives. Our mission at the Borderlands Foundation, it was founded right after the war started in 2022, is to make sure that Ukraine's heroes are never forgotten. And there's two things that I'm passionate about helping Ukraine do. Number one is build a strong future for Ukraine, for my family that I'm raising here in Ukraine, through national military history study and education. I believe that nations, great nations, are founded and sustained and grow in strength based on the stories that those nations believe together about their history, and Ukraine has had a very complicated history. It's a very old country. A lot of people don't understand that Ukraine's 500 years older than actually Russia, as Ukraine was around before Russia. Ukraine was founded by Vikings that moved to this part of the world in the eighth and ninth century, and were traders and became rulers of the local Slavic peoples. So, Ukraine, Kyivan Rus', was an ancient and the most powerful empire in Europe, and Ukraine's history is very controversial. Through the years, Russia has appropriated it, stolen it, called it their own, and then tried to change history to make it their own, this great rich heritage that Ukraine has. 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This is something we're developing. We want to launch this if and when the full-scale fighting with Russia pauses. We believe this could be a much bigger tour that people can come on a tour just buying individual seats and over a couple of weeks meet people from all over the world who want to see Ukraine. But before we do that public version of the tour where anyone can book any number of seats at scheduled times, if any of you would like to have a tour of the battlefields of Ukraine that have already been liberated and are safe... We don't do war tourism to active parts of the fighting, but we do historical staff ride battlefield tours for military professionals, government officials, and/or business leaders that would like to understand what has happened here. You can contact us about the Heroes of Ukraine Tour. So, that's the Ukraine Military History Institute, which pays for and produces this podcast. The next sponsor I'd like to discuss is the Ukraine Center for Traumatic Stress. This is a center that is near and dear to my heart because of my past service in combat as a soldier, my study of history and the history of psychological trauma that comes from serving in combat, personal experience of my own, overcoming my own struggles with it. Is a center dedicated to helping advance the research conversation and funding of breakthrough technologies and treatments for post-traumatic stress disorder, which affects a number of soldiers who've served in Ukraine, and we want to make sure that they recover psychologically to become productive, vibrant leaders in the future of Ukraine. This is headed by Major General Vladyslav Klochkov, retired, the former commander, the first commander of the Moral-Psychological Support Forces of Ukraine under the commander-in-chief, President Volodymyr Zelensky. It was a new position that he created right before the full-scale invasion. And General Klochkov has written his PhD on military psychology of a soldier and is passionate about advancing the study and the treatment of this disorder for veterans. This is a podcast that we're going to be releasing very soon in , translated into for those who are not that want to listen in on the conversation and comment on it on our social media. But the interviews will be conducted in to advance and start the conversation for veterans, mental health professionals, and government officials who are working on this problem, which we believe is critical to solve for the future of Ukraine. So, if you'd like to donate to support that podcast to help us produce and start that conversation, or if you'd like to inquire about donating to supporting specific veterans going through different treatments, workshops, for treatment of PTSD, you're welcome to reach out to us. The center also has a rehabilitation through golf program where we pay for veterans to play golf and go play in our annual Heroes of Ukraine Freedom Summit Golf Tournament, which will be held next year in Dallas in the United States in March. And this is a very important program that you can also take a look at sponsoring veterans in their journey to mental health recovering. So, that's the Ukraine Center for Traumatic Stress. And then finally, for those of you who watch this podcast, that you see our co-hosts, some of the guests that come on there, all of our podcasts are filmed in Ukraine. The reason we do this is I believe in talking to Ukrainians and people who will actually come to Ukraine that want to speak about military history, analysis of the current war, defense industry issues, all the things that we need to learn in Ukraine and our allies in NATO who've supported Ukraine to fight and win the next war against our adversaries, Russia, China, Iran. All of the people that support Vladimir Putin are learning from this war the lessons that Russia's learning. We need to make sure that we learn the lessons from the war that Ukrainians are learning better and implement those across the force for our partner forces, Americans, British, all the other European NATO forces, partners out east, Japan, South Korea, Australia. All the countries that are supporting Ukraine, we want to make sure that we create a community that disseminates those lessons. And we get contacted by different groups, sometimes governments, foreign militaries that would like advisory services to help them learn and implement the lessons of this war for their armed forces. Defense companies reach out and would like to get help developing, testing their product, selling their product inside Ukraine, that may be helpful on the battlefield. That's what the Borderlands Group does. We advise defense tech companies. We even do forward support engineering for defense tech companies, software development hardware, hiring and staffing a forward deployed engineering shop for Western defense companies. So all those services, if you're looking for advisory services, custom analytical studies by Rob Lee and his team, defense advisory services for defense companies or foreign militaries, we can put together a package for you, give you a proposal and help you with that. So, to get in touch with us, just go to the website for the borderlandsgroup.com. Fill out our contact desk form. We'll evaluate your request and get back to you in the appropriate secure communication channel if that's what you'd like to do. So, thank you for watching (laughs) the sponsor reads here. It's important to me that we provide value to you in every podcast episode, and these are the ways that you can support us so we can continue to afford to produce and expand and increase the frequency of our content production for the benefit of Ukraine and its allies fighting this war, winning this war, and the next. (music)