Ukraine Military History Institute
A harder half year is not the same as a reversal
Rob Lee and Francis Farrell had just spent about seven days driving the front when they sat down to describe it in early September 2026: a few days in Zaporizhzhia, one day in Pokrovsk, two days in Sloviansk, then Izium and Kharkiv on the way back. Lee is careful about what that buys. You cannot see everything, he says, but of the priority directions they came away with a decent understanding.
His summary has two halves. The first half of 2026 went better for Ukraine than expected, for several reasons, among them Russia losing access to Starlink and the effects of the middle strike campaign. Russian advances slowed. The second half, he expects, will be tougher.
Farrell agrees with that forecast and then adds the point that frames the rest of the conversation. The public narrative runs like a roller coaster: Ukraine is winning, Ukraine has no chance, time is on Ukraine's side, time is on Russia's side. The fight he hears about from commanders does not move that way. It goes day by day, up and down a bit, but not in swings.
Ask whether the war changed, or your picture of it
Farrell's discipline is a question to put to yourself before declaring a trend reversed. When things look worse, is that a real change on the battlefield, or a correction to your own understanding of where things stood?
In spring and early summer, he says, everyone was on a very positive upward slope. Some of today's gloom may simply be that optimism being marked down, rather than the front itself deteriorating at the same rate.
He offers a comparison to calibrate against. A year earlier was a much tougher period for Ukraine. That was when the large infiltration at Dobropillia reached 15 to 20 kilometres behind the front line. If it had not been stopped, Farrell says, it could potentially have brought the battle for Donbas to an end a lot quicker.
Set against that, the current picture is different in kind. Russia has reached the fortress belt in the south at Kostiantynivka, but that battle is still far from over. It is getting closer to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, but Farrell describes nothing chaotic and nothing disastrous.
The front and the strikes on Kyiv are separate stories
Both men draw the same line, and it matters for reading the news. Lee points to the Geran-4 strikes that are getting through in Kyiv, including a strike on the SBU building a day or two before the recording. He expects Russia to go after the energy grid again and says everyone knows the winter will be difficult.
Farrell is explicit that the strikes on Kyiv are "a different story." When it comes to the front line itself, his conversations do not support the view that things have swung back into a real negative trend.
A reader who merges the two will overstate the military situation in one direction or the other. The capital can be having a bad month while the brigades are holding.
Slower advances, worse directions
Lee's concern is not speed. Russian advances, he says, are still slower than they were last year. The problem is where they are pointed.
Russia is now advancing toward each of the remaining cities Ukraine holds, and the situation and the atmosphere around them are becoming more difficult. Places that used to be somewhat safe, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk among them, are now frontline cities.
He calls the coming battles for those two cities one of the defining parts of the war. How far Russia gets and how long it takes are open to debate, he says, but the fight will be critical.
Sloviansk closes a twelve year loop
The weight of Sloviansk is not only operational. The town is where much of this war began in 2014, and Lee notes that some of the brigade commanders defending it today fought there then. In that sense the battle is literally the culmination of 12 years.
The units there made their position clear to Lee and Farrell. These cities are not something they will give up, and if Russia tries to take them it will pay a heavy price.
Farrell places the fight on a longer clock than the news cycle. The big climax, the battle for Donbas, could play out over two or three years. He sees both sides positioning their forces for it, and points to the restructuring Drapatyi has carried out in the command of the Donetsk region as evidence of that preparation. He adds that it could coincide with mobilization, which he says could still be a very big threat.
The south is in better shape than a year ago
The other half of Farrell's picture is Zaporizhzhia. The southern situation, he says, has improved a lot since the autumn of the previous year. He cites the counterattacks carried out by the air assault forces, and says the brigades defending Zaporizhzhia are more or less controlling the situation.
That is part of why he resists the reversal story. A front where the south has stabilised and the east is under slow, serious pressure is not the same as a front that is breaking.
The year as an argument about territory
Farrell ends with a judgement rather than a forecast. The way the last year played out, he says, is a vindication of why Ukraine was not even considering the ideas, from Russia and from the Trump administration, of simply handing this territory over.
Sam Cook, introducing the episode, puts the practical stakes on the calendar. Lee's conclusion is that the next month will decide the winter: Russian forces have to be held far enough out that when the October fog comes there is no window to exploit.
What to watch
- Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Lee calls the battles for them defining. Whether Russian forces reach the cities this winter, or are held short of them, tests the claim that advances are slow but dangerous.
- Kostiantynivka. Farrell says the fortress belt battle is far from over. If it ends quickly, his "nothing chaotic" reading was too generous.
- The southern front around Zaporizhzhia. Farrell describes brigades more or less in control after air assault counterattacks. A Russian breakthrough there would undercut the case that the second half is harder but not a reversal.