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Rob Lee on the OSINT That Exposed Russia's 2022 Buildup

No covering exercise, 85% of BTGs moved, Su-25s from Vladivostok: Rob Lee on the open-source signals that set 2022 apart from earlier war scares.

· 5 min read. Drawn from “Why Ukraine's Military History Matters”, published 11 June 2026. Figures and assessments are as stated on that date.

Rob Lee called the 2022 invasion from open-source signals that no earlier war scare had shown: no covering exercise, about 85% of Russia's battalion tactical groups moved, and Su-25s brought from Vladivostok. Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, assembled the picture largely from civilian TikTok videos of trains passing through Russian cities.

He is careful about how much of that was his own work. He describes himself as not good at geolocating and not good at scraping social media. Other people did the collecting, and his part was putting the pieces together. What follows is his own account of which signals changed his mind, which ones pointed the other way, and why, as Sam Cook puts it in the conversation, the analysts in Moscow were the more sceptical.

Where did the open-source evidence come from?

Russia's rail lines run through cities, so when Russia moved equipment, it moved past people's windows. Civilians filmed the trains and posted the videos on TikTok, sometimes with nothing more than "I live in this city, and this is what I'm seeing."

A few accounts gathered that material. Lee names Girkin Girkin, which posted a large number of the TikTok videos, and Necromancer. The CIT Team did similar work. Others read the numbers on the trains to work out where they had come from and where they were heading, and Sam Cook adds vehicle markings. Lee's verdict on the method: "it was actually pretty simple."

He had seen the pattern before. In Syria, he says, much of the useful analysis of Russia's operations came not from outside specialists but from Syrians tracking what Russia was doing around them. The people closest to the movement saw it first.

Hear Rob Lee on this, at 12:15From “Why Ukraine's Military History Matters”

Which indicators made 2022 different?

By January, Lee says, it was clear the buildup was very nonstandard. His best case at that point was still coercion, but coercion on a scale unprecedented since the Soviet Union collapsed. The indicators he lists:

| Indicator | Why it mattered to Lee | |---|---| | No big exercise | Removed the usual cover story. "There was no good justification other than Russia's trying to coerce Ukraine or is gonna try and use military force." | | Naval component sent to the Black Sea | Unprecedented in size. | | About 85% of battalion tactical groups moved | His own hedged figure ("like, what, 85%") for Russia's permanent-readiness units. | | Su-25s from as far as Vladivostok | Assets from the other end of the country. | | Eastern Military District moving in early January | "Another really bad sign." Every military district was moving to Ukraine's border. | | District-level assets such as S-300V systems | Moved, some of them very close to the border. |

He set these against the base rate. Since he had been watching, every spring or summer brought an article asking whether Russia would launch a full-scale invasion this year: 2016, 2017, 2018. In most of those cases, he says, there were no objective indicators. This time there were, and that is what changed his view. He had not previously believed a full-scale invasion was coming.

The TikTok video that made him doubt his own reading

Not every signal pointed the same way. In mid-February, about 10 days before the invasion, Russia began moving equipment from the large training areas towards the border, by rail, perhaps 10 or 15 kilometres at a time. At one small rail stop in Belgorod, Lee recalls, units offloaded equipment and left it there with very little security. A civilian posted a TikTok video of children walking up to S-300V systems.

His reaction at the time was that this was a bizarre thing to see. An army about to invade would surely keep civilians away from high-level assets. "Maybe I'm wrong," he remembers thinking.

Hear Rob Lee describe the video of children beside S-300V launchers at 16:44.

Other signals pulled the same way. A friend told him that a soldier he knew, heading to Belarus for the exercise, held a return ticket.

Why did Russian soldiers act as if no war was coming?

Because, as it turned out, nobody had told them. Lee's explanation is that Russia decided not to tell its own soldiers at low level. He thinks battalion commanders found out about two weeks before, at most. The troops were following orders for a training exercise, so they took no steps to hide anything.

The secrecy went to the top. Lee thinks Lavrov did not know, and that for many people in the Kremlin the moment of realisation came only about two days before, with the recognition of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. Only those holding the security portfolio knew the plan. His conclusion is that US intelligence, and he thinks British intelligence too, understood Russia's plans in October and November better than senior Kremlin officials did two days before the invasion.

The argument that convinced him

Lee's reasoning went beyond the movements. Russia's rhetoric had changed clearly in 2021, including Putin's July 2021 essay, which he says set the ideological conditions for a full-scale invasion. A spring buildup had ended with the Putin and Biden summit and produced nothing. A second buildup in the autumn, he reasoned, meant Putin was unlikely to back down without a concession, because repeated threats without follow-through cost credibility.

Then, in December, Russia published demands to NATO, including a return to 1997 and no US troops in Eastern European countries. Lee read them as almost designed to be rejected.

Even so, he did not expect an attempt to occupy the whole country. He expected compellence: force used to extract concessions. And he remained uncertain to the end, asking himself whether anyone would really see a full-scale invasion in Europe in this era.

Why the Moscow analysts got it wrong

One detail stands out for anyone who reads foreign policy for a living. Lee raises the question of whether foreign policy analysts in Moscow understand the Kremlin better than analysts abroad. Sam Cook answers that they were more sceptical: the analysts and journalists living in Moscow were all being told by their connections that "this is not gonna happen". Lee agrees. The people with the best access to the Kremlin's mood had the least access to its plans.

Sam Cook adds a practical lesson from his own decision. In December he warned his company that the buildup was a serious risk, and was told he was crazy. He had set a tripwire in advance: if forces went into Belarus, Kyiv itself was under threat, and he would start moving his people to western Ukraine. When he saw the move into Belarus, he acted.

Lee's later reading of the war, and why he still will not call a turning point, is in Rob Lee on whether the war is at a turning point. Who learns most from this war is in Russia's drone crews as an export.

Frequently asked questions

  • He pointed to indicators no earlier war scare had shown: no covering exercise, about 85% of battalion tactical groups moved by his own estimate, Su-25s from Vladivostok and every military district moving to the border. Hear Rob Lee on the indicators at 15:17.
  • Rob Lee says Russia chose not to tell its own soldiers at low level, and he thinks battalion commanders found out about two weeks before at most. Hear him on the soldiers with return tickets to Belarus at 18:23.
  • Rob Lee names Girkin Girkin, which posted many civilian TikTok videos of trains, Necromancer and the CIT Team. More on his work is on Rob Lee's speaker page.
  • Rob Lee discuss it in “Why Ukraine's Military History Matters” (11 June 2026), from 12:15. Listen from 12:15, or on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.
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