Ukraine Military History Institute
Nobody has said what the end state is
Rob Lee starts at the level of grand strategy. What is the way to end the war on the best terms for Ukraine? What is the desired end state, what end state is realistic, and how does Ukraine get there?
His answer is that this has not been communicated clearly for some time. He is not sure what the strategy was in 2024 or 2025. It seemed to be: do not give up any territory, and hope Russia collapses and cannot keep fighting. There was no obvious strategy for getting Russia to the negotiating table.
There has been more said this year. Lee points to Volodymyr Zelenskyy's 40-day operation, carried out by the SBU and concluded the day before they recorded, which was meant to coerce Russia toward peace. It did not achieve that bigger goal. Asked by Dmytro Putiata whether Russia responded to it at all, Lee says he guesses not. It may have achieved tactical and operational results, but strategically it is not there yet.
Russia is past diminishing returns but can still do damage
Lee does not pretend coercion is easy. Vladimir Putin is committed to this war. At a minimum he wants to take all of Donbas, he has greater designs, and he wants to inflict terms on Ukraine. Putiata adds: and on Europe. Lee agrees it is a broader matter involving NATO and Europe, with Ukraine at the centre.
Putin has already taken enormous costs: manpower, geopolitical losses with the Bashar al-Assad regime and elsewhere, to which Putiata adds Armenia, and significant long-term economic damage. He continues the war anyway.
Lee's view is that Russia reached diminishing returns some time ago. The costs are increasing, and what Russia can still gain is probably not going to get much greater. But it can still kill a lot of Ukrainians, do a lot of damage to Ukraine's economy and really affect its long-term prospects. That is what any strategy has to answer.
The strategy should be sustainability
So what should it be? Lee's answer is sustainability: being able to keep fighting and prevent Russia from achieving its maximalist objectives a year, two years, three years from now. If the war goes another two years, does Ukraine have the manpower and the economic resources to do it?
The problem, as he sees it, is that Ukraine has consistently looked at everything in a short-term way: get through this week, get through this month, stem the losses. The question he wants asked instead is what has to be done today so that Russia is not advancing six months or a year from now. Ask it that way, he says, and the way Ukraine fights might be different as well.
He traces some of this back to Bakhmut, while stressing that it has been a broader issue.
Manpower was never treated as the priority
Mobilization is where the short-term habit shows most. Lee calls manpower the biggest strategic challenge for Mykhailo Drapatyi as he takes over, and says it has been the strategic challenge the entire time. It has not been treated as the priority. It has been seen as a lower priority.
Putiata notes that Drapatyi has just relieved the general staff's commander in charge of manpower and the commander in charge of logistics, and is bringing in different people.
Frontline units ask what the general staff is for
Lee describes a perception among frontline commanders: what does the general staff actually do? Does it support the corps, the task forces, the brigades? At different times, he says, commanders have told him they do not see that support. Maybe some things are happening, but they do not see them.
Putiata's interjection is sharper. These questions have answers, he says, and they are written in law. The responsibilities are set down strictly. But no one is following that law: not the MOD, not the general staff, none of them.
Drapatyi looks down the chain, not up
Lee knows how Drapatyi worked as commander of the joint forces for the Northern Command. His priority was supporting the corps: what do they need, and how can he help his subordinates fight their fight the way they need to, on the understanding that they know their area better than he does.
Lee expects him to reform the general staff partly by replacing people who have been there for some time with people who know the front line as it is now, including the drone situation. Because that situation changes every few months, someone who has spent two years on the general staff is, in Lee's words, just out of touch. Rotation is normal anyway. Militaries need fresh blood, bringing fighters back to staff roles and the other way round.
Drapatyi also named cultural problems when he was land forces commander. Lee lists them: lying in the military, commanders not taking responsibility, and a lack of initiative and creativity. Drapatyi made a big point of saying it needed to improve.
What to watch
- A stated end state. Lee's complaint is that none has been clearly communicated since at least 2024. A public strategy that names what Ukraine is aiming for would answer it.
- Manpower moving up the priority list. Watch who replaces the dismissed manpower chief and whether mobilization policy changes in Drapatyi's first months.
- General staff appointments from the front. Lee expects people who know the current drone fight. Their backgrounds will show whether the reform is substantive.