Artillery still does what FPV drones cannot, says Rob Lee: it is what forced Russian and North Korean assaults into small groups, because an FPV team kills one soldier at a time. Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Dmytro Putiata, a veteran sergeant of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces who worked with two artillery brigades for a year, both argue that drones made guns more effective, not obsolete.
Their numbers come from August 2026. Sam Cook adds one that runs against the usual figure: a source he describes as very deep inside the defence industry told him the often quoted 90% of casualties caused by drones is very inflated, and that it is "probably more like 60-40" between drones and artillery. Lee rejects that later in the same discussion: "I don't think that's true. I think the percentage of casualties is plus 80%." When he asked every brigade he talked to the previous year, he says, the number "was like 75 percent or higher pretty much every single time."
Do drones cause most casualties in Ukraine?
On paper, yes; in practice, partly because of artillery. Putiata says Cook's figure surprises him, because commanders tell him that in most cases they destroy Russian targets with drones. Then he qualifies it: they destroy them with drones because artillery led to that.
Lee explains why the count tilts towards drones. Russia attacks by infiltration, one, two or three men at a time, and it makes no sense to fire several artillery rounds at them when a Mavic or an FPV will do. So the casualty ratio is mostly drones, he says, "partially because of the character of the fighting right now." In the opening period of any other war, he expects artillery to be the main casualty-producing weapon, because it can kill at scale.
Putiata's image for the relationship: drones and artillery are like fingers on your hand. None of them is absolute. "You need to have a fist."
Hear Rob Lee on this, at 39:39From “Russia Is Learning Faster Than You Think”Why did Russia switch to infiltration in the first place?
Because of artillery. In 2024, Lee says, Russia was conducting squad and platoon-size infantry assaults and losing too many people, so it concluded it was better to send a platoon forward in ones and twos over a day. A whole platoon caught in the open by drones and a couple of DPICM rounds is done.
Putiata gives the mechanism. A platoon with small arms can shut down your drones. It cannot shut down an artillery shell. It is surprised, takes killed and wounded, retreats, and on the way back the drones finish it. Small groups are slow, and a slow attack is a manageable one. If you lose the artillery, Lee warns, you get that risk back.
Kursk, December 2024: the week the guns stayed silent
Lee's case study is the North Korean assaults in Kursk in December 2024. They began in company and battalion-size dismounted groups. In the first week Russia put up a lot of ISR drones, and the Ukrainian guns did not want to open fire and be located. With very little artillery, FPVs and Mavic drops did most of the killing, and it was not enough: the mass was too much, and the Ukrainians were pushed back.
After that week, once the ISR problem was handled and Ukrainian artillery opened up, the North Koreans took very heavy losses and changed tactics: no longer company-size assaults, but squads, the same adaptation Russia had made.
Hear Rob Lee on the week Ukrainian guns stayed silent at Kursk at 40:06.
Why can't FPVs alone stop a mass assault?
Lee gives the arithmetic. One FPV team kills one soldier at a time. An FPV flies at about one minute per kilometre. It usually takes multiple FPVs to kill one soldier. A brigade's FPV teams are sized for the numbers it normally faces, and if the infantry simply outnumber them, the teams struggle. "There's a reason for artillery, a reason for everything."
Weather adds another limit. In heavy rain, low cloud and fog, Lee says, drones fly less and see worse, so counter-battery radar and acoustic sensors matter again for finding Russian guns.
How did drones make artillery better?
By giving every gun every camera. Lee says constant reconnaissance, through apps such as Vezha and Delta, made Ukrainian artillery "much, much more effective." On Vezha a unit can see every UAV feed, so a battery gains from every drone over the battlespace, not just its own, and can task drone operators to look at a target for it.
The tools are also merging inside the gun units. In some artillery brigades, Lee says, every battery has a Dart team, flying a fixed-wing FPV, and a fibre-optic FPV team. If Russian ISR is overhead, the battery can launch a Dart and not be located; if it fires the gun, it probably will be.
Putiata's own experience is that the brigades he worked with used the Dart all the time, and 80% of the launches were also supported by artillery fire. He puts the Dart's range at up to 100 kilometres, with Starlink. Without Starlink, he says, it is absolutely different.
Where artillery is weakest
Putiata names it: short-range ammunition. A gun that has to sit close to the line can be suppressed by guided bombs, FPVs, loitering munitions and fibre-optic drones. Longer range keeps it out of that envelope and lets it strike deeper.
Both sides are now hunting guns with drones. Putiata recalls a Ukrainian unit launching large FPV drones against Russian artillery and fully destroying it, which matters because, in his experience, Soviet artillery is quite hard to destroy. Russia, for its part, is sending Shaheds with seekers and a 50-kilo warhead against Ukrainian artillery positions. Each side, he says, watches the other, copies, adapts and tries to create something of its own.
What a successful offensive needs, by Putiata's list, is in Putiata on Ukraine's next offensive.
What to watch
- Assault group size. Lee's argument predicts that where Ukrainian artillery is degraded, Russian assaults grow back from ones and twos towards squads and platoons.
- The casualty split. If detailed data emerges, see whether it lands nearer the 60/40 that Cook's source gave or the 75% or higher that Lee heard from brigades.
Ukraine Military History Institute