Ukraine will manoeuvre again, but not as a second Robotyne, says Dmytro Putiata: the next counteroffensive will be much smaller and use combinations of technology nobody has tried before. Dmytro Putiata, a veteran sergeant of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, points to the proof that attack is still possible: since February 2026, Airborne brigades have broken through up to 12 kilometres with armour.
He and Rob Lee came back to the question three times between May and August 2026. Their answers explain why the large counteroffensive many people expected did not come, and what a Ukrainian attack is more likely to look like instead.
What will the next Ukrainian counteroffensive look like?
Small, and new in method rather than size. "It's gonna happen," Putiata said in May 2026. "But please do not expect that it's gonna be like Robotyne 2.0. Nope. It's a much smaller way." What Ukraine does, he expects, will include things "not done by anyone else before", built on different kinds of technology.
His short list of what any successful offensive needs has four items: a goal, proper planning, reconnaissance and responsibility. By responsibility he means one person who owns the operation, not the commander at the very top but "maybe some kind of colonel or some brigade general." Technology is missing from the list on purpose. "We know how to deal with drones," he says, and it is not only about interception.
He also wants Western support to reach whole corps, not single units, because an army corps should be able to manoeuvre and defend itself, not just one brigade, regiment or battalion.
Hear Dmytro Putiata on the next offensive at 1:01:51.
Hear Dmytro Putiata on this, at 1:01:46From “The Kill Zone: Drone Warfare & Brigade Autonomy”Can undermanned brigades still attack?
Rob Lee thinks the chance is still there. Ukrainian brigades are undermanned, he says, and attacking "requires planning, preparation" and forces. But "the opportunity is there." His example is the Huliaipole operation, in the area north of the town around Ternova. Ukraine did not take back Huliaipole, he stresses, but the operation "could have gone better" and could have achieved a real breakthrough instead of a deep breach.
He does not claim to know what happens next. "It's hard to say, of course," he says, but he would not be surprised if Ukraine pushed Russia back in some directions while Russia advanced in others. In his view the conditions are there.
His explanation points at the other side. Putin, Lee says, consistently gives the military unreasonable objectives, and generals further down the chain have to carry those orders out. Each order comes with a timeline, and a commander who misses it gets replaced. That incentivises lying: Russian units claim villages they have not taken, or send men forward to plant a flag. Lee names a lack of proper planning, reconnaissance and concentration of fire as reasons Russian forces seem unable to break through, and he calls lying inside the Russian military a strong vulnerability that Ukraine can exploit.
The armoured counterattacks few people know about
Putiata calls them "one turning point that people don't really know." Since February, the Ukrainian Airborne forces have carried out several successful counterattacks with armour: in fog during the winter, and again in late May and summer. Tanks, he says, were literally crushing Russian towed artillery.
They broke through up to 12 kilometres, with tanks supporting by direct fire, not as artillery, alongside armoured personnel carriers. Asked which units, he answers with a hedge: "as far as I remember", the 95th and 82nd Airborne Brigades, and both, with the 80th and 79th, were conducting similar operations at the time he spoke, in August.
He is "100% sure", he says, that the Airborne saved the Ukrainian front line and the Ukrainian state, and that people do not understand how bad the situation was. His advice to anyone who visits the front, even if they go only every four months, is to have a conversation with the Airborne brigades, because people usually go to the units that talk about themselves quite a lot.
Are tanks dead?
No, if the battlefield is prepared. Sam Cook, a former armoured cavalry officer, credits Lee with the formulation he accepts: tanks are not dead unless you fail to work out how to protect them. Putiata puts the condition in one sentence: you need to prepare the battlefield for tanks and other vehicles.
Hear Dmytro Putiata on the Airborne breakthroughs at 21:14.
Why didn't the expected counteroffensive happen?
Putiata admits he expected one himself. After the middle strike campaign hit Russian logistics and headquarters, he thought a counteroffensive would follow, and he says Oleksandr Syrskyi planned something for the end of August or mid-September, which some people announced publicly.
By August he was not sure it would happen, or that there was a point in doing it, because "it's all about the resources" and Ukraine is strictly limited in terms of everything. That is a statement about capacity, not intent, and it fits his May forecast: smaller operations, not a large armoured push.
Where a breakthrough is likely to come from
Lee expects it from the bottom up. The assault forces concept, how to fight and attack in a drone environment and how to combine counter-UAS with offensive UAS, is new, he says, and units are still tinkering with it. That tinkering, despite the manpower problems, is where he sees a unit's chance of a breakthrough.
He adds that Western defence companies now see Ukraine as "the incubator for everything." A UAV that works in Zaporizhzhia may not work in Pokrovsk, because of frequencies and jamming, and Putiata agrees.
Lee also links attack to bargaining. If middle and deep strike keep expanding and Russia struggles to protect Crimea, he argues, the front line may move but Russia may not end the war in a stronger position. The Black Sea Fleet headquarters has already been hit, and the fleet is now in Novorossiysk, not Sevastopol.
What artillery still does that drones cannot, and why it decides how big an assault can be, is in artillery vs FPV drones.
Ukraine Military History Institute