North Korean troops fought in Russia's war against Ukraine, learned about FPV drones and changed their tactics, according to Rob Lee, and North Korea is now setting up its own Shahed capabilities. Lee's larger point is that adversaries learn too: North Korea has combat experience it had not had for some time, and when the war ends Russia's UAV teams and operators, in his words, "can go places".
Rob Lee is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and a US Marine veteran who reports from frontline units in Ukraine. He made the North Korea point in Kyiv, in remarks published in June 2026, and repeated it, with more detail, at the end of August 2026.
What did North Korea learn from the war in Ukraine?
Lee's list is short and concrete:
- They fought. North Korean troops went into combat in a live drone war.
- They learned FPVs. In his words, "they've learned about FPVs. They changed their tactics."
- They are building strike drones. North Korea is "setting up, like, their own Shahed capabilities".
- They have combat experience. Lee notes they had not had any for some time.
Samuel Cook went a step further: "They're teaching the Chinese, for sure." Lee did not take that up. He moved straight on to the Shahed point, so the claim about China is Cook's, not his.
At the end of August 2026 Lee went over the same ground in more detail. The North Koreans have fought, he said, they are adapting their tactics, they are building Shaheds in North Korea and they are adopting FPVs. He added a soldier's judgement of the troops themselves: when they fought the Ukrainians, they were "very physically tough", people "we should not underestimate". He put Iran in the same list. Iran is sharing information with Russia, the Shahed technology came to Russia, and now Russia is providing it back, so Iran is improving these systems.
Hear Rob Lee on what North Korea learned at 49:24, and his August 2026 update on North Korea and Iran at 56:04.
Hear Rob Lee on this, at 49:10From “Why Ukraine's Military History Matters”Why does Lee measure it against China?
Because, for the US military, China is the pacing threat. Lee's test is simple: the US has to learn more lessons from this war than China does, "at a minimum". He was not confident that was happening. By August 2026 he put it more sharply: "If the U.S. learns less from this war than China, we've just failed."
Cook widened the frame to the Pacific. If Taiwan and China came to hot war, he argued, US allies there, Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines, would have a hard time staying out of the fight. That is Cook's judgement, not Lee's.
Where could Russia's drone crews go after the war?
This is the part of Lee's argument that is easiest to underrate. When the war ends, Russia will have a large number of combat-trained troops and a large number of UAV teams and operators.
Cook named Africorps. Lee agreed it will be part of it, then widened the map: it might be Africa, the Middle East or Latin America. Beside the state vehicle there is the private one. Lee sketched the pitch a freelance crew could make: a four or eight man team that can operate FPVs very effectively. Dropped into a country with no UAV defences and no background in FPVs, he said, a team like that could be quite significant.
He listed what follows without softening it: a threat of assassinations, mercenaries and criminal gangs. The organiser could be Africorps or some other, more private, Wagner-type company. Cook drew the political conclusion that such teams could destabilise regimes, or protect them.
In August 2026 Lee made the same forecast: Russian FPV teams, either part of the Africa Corps or as mercenaries, going to Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and "a huge problem". He added the other side of it. While Russia is focused on Ukraine, the threat to NATO and other places is reduced; when the war ends, Russia can deploy people elsewhere. And Ukraine will have the expertise in countering them.
Who can stop drone teams like these?
Lee does not leave the threat hypothetical. He points at cases already running:
- Hezbollah has started to use fiber optic FPVs, and it does not look as if the IDF has really good solutions so far.
- In a number of NATO exercises with drone teams, the exercising forces have struggled to deal with them.
The contrast is his conclusion. Ukraine has developed a system to handle Russia, to handle Shaheds, to handle FPVs. Other countries have not developed that system yet, and Lee calls that a risk in its own right. He does not think NATO countries are doing a sufficiently good job so far, for different reasons, some of them bureaucratic. He has also heard, he says carefully, anecdotes of generals who are somewhat dismissive of the war's lessons and do not think they necessarily apply. "This is not how America would fight," Cook offered, as the attitude in question.
Does the war end, or spread?
Lee framed the risk as a set of conditionals rather than a forecast. Russian advances have slowed, and he accepts "some form of turning point" in that Ukraine has advantages it did not have before. But on net, he said, Russia was still advancing, though that could change, and he would not be shocked to see Ukraine push back, maybe that summer or in the autumn.
If the battlefield, deep strikes on economic targets and a lack of Russian advance are still not enough to make Putin seek a deal, he asked, what does Russia do? Return to nuclear threats? Try to expand the war, or coerce NATO members? Climb the escalation ladder to show it has a higher risk tolerance than NATO? Cook added two concrete versions: a drone campaign against NATO countries to destroy their industry, and testing NATO directly. Lee did not say which, if any, Russia would choose.
Either way, his point stands: the lessons are being learned by more than one side. Lee's account of how open sources caught Russia's 2022 buildup is in how the invasion buildup showed on TikTok.
Ukraine Military History Institute