Ukraine Military History Institute
North Korea already went to school on this war
Rob Lee makes the point almost in passing, which is what makes it land. The North Koreans fought. They learned about FPVs. They changed their tactics.
That is not a small sentence. It means a third country sent troops into a live drone war, took the lessons, and adjusted. Lee adds that North Korea is setting up its own Shahed capabilities, and that the force now has combat experience it had not had for some time.
Samuel Cook pushes it one step further and says they are teaching the Chinese for sure. Lee does not endorse that specific claim, and it is worth keeping the two statements separate. What Lee does commit to is the general principle: the value of this war is not only in the lessons Ukraine and its partners learn, but in the lessons adversaries learn.
Cook widens the frame to the Pacific, arguing that if Taiwan and China came to hot war, American allies there, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, would have a hard time staying out of it. That is his judgement rather than a reported fact, and he frames it that way.
The turning point talk is narrower than it sounds
Asked about the state of the front, Lee gives a carefully hedged answer that is more useful than a clean verdict.
Russian advances have slowed. There has been commentary about a turning point, and Lee accepts a limited version of it: Ukraine has advantages right now that it did not have before, and the situation is better. But his summary judgement is that on net, Russia is still advancing.
Cook offers the counterpoint that Ukraine is reclaiming territory in certain sectors. Lee agrees, in some sectors, and holds his overall reading anyway. He then adds that this could change, and that he would not be shocked to see Ukraine push back in the summer or the autumn.
Slowed is not stopped. Better is not winning. Lee keeps the distinction.
If the battlefield does not compel Putin, the pressure has to go somewhere
This is the hinge of the conversation, and Lee builds it as a conditional rather than a prediction.
Suppose the battlefield situation, combined with deeper strikes on economic targets and a lack of Russian advance, is still not enough to make Putin conclude the war has become too costly and seek a deal. Then Ukraine may start retaking territory. And then the question becomes what Russia does about that.
Lee lists the options as questions, not forecasts. Does Russia return to nuclear threats, and is that realistic. Does it try to expand the war in some capacity. Does it try to coerce NATO members. Does it climb the escalation ladder to demonstrate that it has a higher risk tolerance than NATO does.
Cook supplies two concrete versions: a drone campaign against NATO countries aimed at destroying their industry, and testing NATO directly.
None of this is asserted as likely. It is the set of moves available to a state that cannot get what it wants on the ground, laid out by someone who declines to say which one gets picked.
The people are the transferable part, and they outlast the war
Then Lee makes the argument that is easiest to underrate.
When the war ends, Russia will be left holding a large number of combat trained troops and a large number of UAV teams and operators. In his phrasing, these guys can go places.
Cook names Africorps. Lee agrees it will be part of it, and immediately loosens the geography: it might not even be Africa. It might be the Middle East. It might be Latin America.
Beyond the state vehicle there is the private one. Lee describes the pitch a freelance crew could make: a four or eight man team that can operate FPVs very effectively. Dropped into a country with no UAV defences and no background in FPVs, he says, that can be quite significant. From there he lists the downstream threats without softening them: assassinations, mercenaries, criminal gangs. The organising entity could be Africorps, or it could be something more private, a Wagner type company.
Cook draws the political conclusion, that such teams could destabilise regimes or protect them. Both directions, which is the point. The capability is indifferent to whose side it is on.
Hezbollah and the fiber optic FPV are the test case already running
Lee does not leave the diffusion argument hypothetical. He points at cases in progress.
The IDF is having issues with Hezbollah, which has started to use fiber optic FPVs. His assessment is that the IDF does not appear to have good solutions so far.
He extends the same finding to the alliance. In NATO exercises involving drone teams, the exercising forces have struggled to deal with them.
The contrast he draws is the actual conclusion. Ukraine has developed a system to handle Russia, to handle Shaheds, to handle FPVs. Other countries have not developed that system yet. Lee calls that a risk in its own right, and closes with a judgement he states plainly: he does not think NATO countries are doing a sufficiently good job so far, for different reasons.
What to watch
- Whether North Korean Shahed production becomes visible. Lee says the capability is being set up. Confirmed domestic production, rather than transferred airframes, would settle it.
- Where Russian trained UAV crews turn up after the fighting stops. Lee names Africa, the Middle East and Latin America as candidates. The first documented four to eight man FPV team operating outside Europe under a private contract is the marker.
- Whether the IDF fields an answer to fiber optic FPVs. Lee says there is no good solution so far. That is falsifiable, and Lebanon is where it gets tested first.