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Why Russia Can't Stop Ukraine's Cheap Drones, by Rob Lee

Rob Lee: Russia lacks the echelon defence Ukraine built against Shaheds since October 2022, so thousands of cheap Hornets and Darts a month get through.

· 5 min read. Drawn from “Back from the Front, Ukraine Closes the Deep-Strike Gap”, published 22 June 2026. Figures and assessments are as stated on that date.

Russia cannot stop Ukraine's cheap strike drones because it lacks the layered defence Ukraine has built against Shaheds since October 2022, while Ukraine sends up thousands of Hornets a month. That is the judgement of Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, back from front-line visits in early June 2026: Ukraine can send drones up, and "a lot of them will get through".

The rest of his answer explains why that gap is hard to close: the drones are small and numerous, intercepting them can cost more than building them, and Russia lost the one link that let it run the same kind of campaign.

What defence does Ukraine have that Russia lacks?

Lee calls it "a more sophisticated echelon system". It has developed since October 2022, when Russia started using Shaheds against Ukraine. Brigades have their own interceptors, corps have interceptors, and so on up the chain. Russia "just doesn't have that. They don't have it to the same extent."

The gap extends to the drones Ukraine flies into the occupied rear. Ukraine, he says, has a more sophisticated counter-UAS system, including against middle strike drones, "than Russia has".

His conclusion is conditional. Russia is going to have a lot of difficulty unless it creates "a really comprehensive echelon system", and "right now, it just doesn't exist."

Hear Lee explain the layered defence Russia lacks at 18:13.

Hear Rob Lee on this, at 18:13From “Back from the Front, Ukraine Closes the Deep-Strike Gap”

Why are Ukraine's drones so hard to shoot down?

Lee gives three reasons.

Size and volume. The Hornet is small and so is the Blyskavka. Samuel Cook sums up the consequence: "A lot cheaper, a lot more mass." Lee describes "thousands of Hornets per month", a large number of Darts as well, "not to mention FP2s". Because they are so cheap, Ukraine can afford to send up a lot of them. Lee contrasts this with the Shahed, which can be used at operational depth but which he dismisses as a crude strike weapon.

The cost of each kill. For Darts and drones like them, Lee says, "the interceptors are arguably more expensive than the drone themself", the medium strike drone. Cook adds the other cost, the skill it takes to intercept. Every successful interception can spend more money and more trained effort than the attacker spent on the launch.

Altitude. Flown low over the lines, these drones face small arms and machine gun fire. Flown higher elsewhere, they sit where "interceptors kind of struggle to get to them". Any single kind of defence covers one band and leaves the other open, which is why layers matter more than any one weapon.

Why does a $4,000 drone change the maths?

Lee's point about cost goes beyond interception. In 2023 there were arguments that HIMARS or ATACMS might set conditions for interdicting Russian lines, but "those weapons are just not responsive enough". You had to bring HIMARS up to fire, and you needed ISR.

Cheap drones remove both constraints. Crews can send them up even without ISR, he says: "If there's no target, it's okay. We can afford to lose a, you know, $4,000 drone." They send drones along the main logistics routes to free hunt, and once one finds targets they send up more and control several at a time, because "the cost ratio has gone down so much".

A Dart with Starlink is still a very cheap drone that can hit targets at operational depth. The Blyskavka, which Lee describes as a kind of copy of Russia's Molniya, carries Starlink too and "can hit things at 100 kilometers or more". These drones, he says, are achieving things "that HIMARS couldn't achieve", because they can be launched in large numbers and are much more responsive. What each of them costs is in how much a Ukrainian strike drone costs.

Why can't Russia do the same to Ukraine?

Cook asks exactly that, and Lee's answer is that Russia tried, in January. It put Starlink on Molniyas, BM-35s and BM-70s, and "for a couple weeks, it was really actually concerning". Russian drones knocked out fuel trucks on the highway from Pavlohrad to Pokrovsk, between Petropavlivka and Pavlohrad, and hit targets around northern Oleksandrivka, including HIMARS systems. For a few weeks it looked as though Russia had "a burgeoning operational strike campaign" with very cheap drones.

It rested on Starlink. "Once they lost that, they lost this capability." Rubicon, he says, needed Starlink for this kind of work, and without it Russia does not have the options.

Russia still has Shaheds, and some carry an FPV camera for dynamic targets. Cook points out that they are a lot more expensive and harder to control, and Lee agrees on the cost. Russia is also developing electronic warfare systems that can jam Starlink and is using them; in some cases Ukrainian drones briefly lose their video feed. Whether Russia can scale that into a systematic system, Lee says, "I'm not sure." Where that jamming stands is in Russia's Starlink jammers.

Will Russia adapt?

Lee does not present the gap as permanent. There is a concern, he says, that Russia "will see what's happening. They'll innovate. They'll copy this." How long that takes, "no one knows". His forecast is hedged both ways: Russia will eventually adapt and develop countermeasures, but "I don't think they're gonna be able to completely kind of erase this challenge."

Cook's view runs the same way from the industrial side: Ukraine's miltech industry is ahead of Russia's in cheap interceptor drones, and Russia has to catch up.

Even partial adaptation costs Russia something. If it cannot use its main roads, Lee says, it has to slow down its logistics, push things further from the front line, or set up counter-UAV teams in different lines and pickets. "All this will cost them, and it all kind of diverts attention away from the front line."

His argument does not rest on one weapon. It rests on several things lining up as of June 2026: years spent building layers against Shaheds, drones cheap enough to send up in thousands, an interception cost that favours the attacker, and a satellite link one side kept and the other lost.

Frequently asked questions

  • Rob Lee says Ukraine has built an echelon defence against Shaheds since October 2022 and Russia lacks one to the same extent, while Ukraine sends up thousands of cheap Hornets a month, so a lot get through. Hear Lee at 18:13.
  • For Darts and similar medium strike drones, Lee says the interceptors are arguably more expensive than the drone itself. The drone prices are in how much a Ukrainian strike drone costs.
  • Lee says Russia put Starlink on Molniyas, BM-35s and BM-70s in January and hit fuel trucks near Pavlohrad, but lost the capability when it lost Starlink. More in Russia's Starlink jammers.
  • Rob Lee discuss it in “Back from the Front, Ukraine Closes the Deep-Strike Gap” (22 June 2026), from 18:13. Listen from 18:13, or on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.
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