Ukraine Military History Institute
Ukraine built its layers against Shaheds, and Russia never had to
Rob Lee starts with a date. Russia began using Shaheds in October 2022, and Ukraine has been building defences against them ever since. What came out of those years is what Lee calls a sophisticated echelon system: defence in layers, with brigades now holding their own interceptors and cores of interceptors behind them.
Russia, in his assessment, does not have that. Not to the same extent.
That is the asymmetry underneath Ukraine's interdiction campaign, and Lee states the consequence plainly. When Ukraine sends drones up, a lot of them get through.
The drones are small, cheap and arriving in thousands
The second half of the explanation is the drones themselves. Lee names the Hornet and the Blyskavka as examples of what Ukraine is flying, and both are small. Samuel Cook draws out what follows from that: a lot cheaper, and therefore a lot more mass.
Lee contrasts them with the Shahed. It can be used at operational depth, but he dismisses it as a crude strike weapon. Ukraine's smaller drones, by his account, are having a lot of success.
Then come the quantities, which are the part that turns a capability into a campaign. Lee describes thousands of Hornets per month, a large number of Darts as well, and that is before counting the FP-2s. Because each one is cheap, Ukraine can afford to send up a great many.
His conclusion on the defensive side is direct. Russia will have a lot of difficulty unless it creates a really comprehensive echelon system, and right now that system does not exist.
Stopping a cheap drone can cost more than the drone
This is the detail that makes the problem harder than a production race.
Talking about the Dart class, Lee says the interceptors are arguably more expensive than the medium strike drone itself. Cook adds the other cost: the skill it takes to make an interception at all.
Put those together and the defender is in an awkward position. Every successful interception may spend more money and more trained effort than the attacker spent launching the drone. A side that is already short of layered defences cannot simply buy its way level on those terms, because each kill makes the exchange worse.
The attacker gets to choose the altitude
Lee adds a tactical point that explains why there is no single fix.
Flown at low altitude over the lines, these drones are exposed to small arms and machine gun fire. Flown higher elsewhere, they sit where interceptors struggle to reach them.
So the operator picks the band according to the threat on a given route. Any single type of defence covers one band and leaves the other open, which is why layers matter more than any one weapon.
Russia wanted this campaign and lost the link it depended on
The irony Lee points to is that this is what Russia itself wanted to do.
Rubicon, he says, was running this kind of interdiction in January. But it needed Starlink for it, and without Starlink Russia does not have the same options. Lee expects Russia will probably develop an alternative eventually. He does not say when.
On the Ukrainian side the same dependency is an advantage. Lee calls Starlink the other big X factor, a huge Ukrainian edge, and quotes one commander who put it simply: "Starlink is our superpower."
Russia will adapt, but Lee does not expect it to close the gap
Lee is careful not to present this as permanent. There is a real concern that Russia will watch what is happening, innovate, and copy it. How long that takes, he says, no one knows.
His forecast is a hedged one. Russia will eventually adapt and develop countermeasures. He does not think it will be able to completely erase the challenge.
Cook's view runs the same way from the industrial side. Ukraine's military technology sector is ahead of Russia's in cheap interceptor drones, and for now Russia is the one that has to catch up.
The argument holds together because it does not rest on any single weapon. It rests on several things lining up at once: years spent building layers against Shaheds, drones cheap enough to send in thousands, an interception cost that favours the attacker, and a communications link one side has and the other lost. Russia can adapt on any one of them. Lee's point is that it would need a comprehensive answer, and that answer does not exist yet.
What to watch
- Russian interceptors at brigade level. Lee's test is whether Russia builds a comprehensive echelon system. Brigades fielding their own interceptor drones would be the first visible sign.
- A return of Russian interdiction at Rubicon's January pace. That would indicate Russia has found a substitute for Starlink, which Lee expects eventually but could not date.
- Hornet and Dart output. The campaign depends on thousands per month. If those numbers fall, the economics that let drones get through fall with them.