What Mykhailo Drapatyi must fix first is manpower, says Rob Lee: it has been Ukraine's biggest strategic challenge for the whole war and has never been treated as the priority. Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Dmytro Putiata, a veteran sergeant of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces who served under Drapatyi at Vovchansk, add three more: a culture of lying, drone units that can only be asked, not ordered, and a general staff that ignores its own legal duties.
They made the list in early August 2026, shortly after Drapatyi replaced Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief. Sam Cook frames the hope in one comparison: a 43-year-old commander replacing a 60-plus-year-old one.
Why is manpower the first thing to fix?
Because everything else depends on it, and it has been handled week to week. Lee's charge is that Ukraine has consistently looked at the war in a short-term way: get through this week, get through this month. The question he wants asked instead is what has to be done today so that Russia is not advancing six months or a year from now.
His proposed strategy is sustainability: being able to keep fighting and stop Russia achieving its maximalist objectives a year, two years, three years from now. Russia, in his view, reached diminishing returns some time ago. What it can still gain is probably not much greater, but it can still kill a lot of Ukrainians and damage Ukraine's long-term prospects. And it shows no sign of stopping: there is no political uprising, coerced contract signings already amount to a covert mobilisation, and Lee sees indications of another mobilisation this autumn.
Putiata dismisses the idea that technology removes the need. Despite all the talk of UGVs holding ground, which he calls, in his opinion, crap, Ukraine needs men, "even just to maintain those kind of robots, so-called." Drapatyi had just relieved the general staff officers in charge of manpower and of logistics.
Hear Rob Lee and Dmytro Putiata on what Drapatyi inherits at 1:39:47.
Hear Rob Lee on this, at 1:39:47From “Russia Is Learning Faster Than You Think”Why can't Ukrainian commanders order drone units?
This is Putiata's sharpest structural point. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces work on their own. Russia copied the concept but put its drone detachments, battalions and regiments under combined arms or military district command, so the commander responsible for a direction can tell them where to go. "In Ukraine, you can only ask, not order, but ask."
The scale makes it worse. One Unmanned Systems Forces brigade, he says, can have 13 battalions, with a huge flow of drones every month. The people who built the branch hold the data and the resources, and can dictate what they do without any larger strategy. He speaks from experience: in his own brigade, he says, he sometimes fought his own way because he disagreed with his commander. "That's horrible," he adds, "but that's the reality."
What does "a culture of lying" mean?
Drapatyi named it himself as land forces commander, Lee says: lying in the military, commanders not taking responsibility, and a lack of initiative. One cause was how commanders were judged. Because the strategy, if there was one, was not to give up territory, commanders were assessed on whether they gave up ground, even when a brigade faced a much larger force without enough soldiers.
Lee's example of how Drapatyi tackles it is personal. As land forces commander, after several Iskander strikes on training areas where ISR drones had been overhead and the troops were not told to take cover, Drapatyi promised to deal with it. When more happened after he took over, he submitted his resignation, saying, as Lee recounts it, that he could not ask subordinates to take responsibility if he did not take it himself.
What should the general staff do differently?
Frontline commanders, Lee says, ask what the general staff actually does for the corps and brigades. Putiata's answer is that those responsibilities are written in law, and no one follows it: "MOD, general staff, none of them."
Lee expects Drapatyi to run the general staff the way he ran the joint forces for the north: his priority there was supporting the corps, on the understanding that they know their sector better than he does. Lee expects personnel changes, because the drone situation changes every few months and anyone two years on the general staff is out of touch. Drapatyi controls promotions, which lets him reward the right behaviour, and Lee expects him to bring younger officers forward and trust subordinates with decentralised execution.
A corps commander's order of priorities
Cook's way into the new commander is a post by the commander of Third Corps about the Lyman sector: twelve months earlier his troops were losing ground, nine months earlier they stabilised, and now they were retaking it. He gave three reasons, in order:
1. Leadership: mission command, decentralisation, trust in junior sergeants. The most important. 2. Training, doctrine, combined arms and unit culture. 3. Drones, UGVs and robotics, the least important without the first two.
What has changed already?
A month later, back from the front, Lee and Francis Farrell reported the first changes. Drapatyi stopped routine weekly inspections of frontline brigades, and the old default that a lost position must be counterattacked at once is now left to commanders' judgement. Farrell says brigade commanders could feel the culture change.
Hear Lee and Farrell on Drapatyi's first changes at 16:46.
Putiata's last requirement runs upwards: better communication with the president, a strategy from him, and a roadmap "like every business is building." None of it, Lee warns, will be immediate. Why a culture of initiative cannot simply be ordered into an army is in Lt. Gen. Zabrodskyi on blitzkrieg.
Ukraine Military History Institute