What Ukraine can and cannot intercept, why the interceptor count matters more than the system, and why hunting the launcher is harder than knowing where it parks.
Air defence is usually discussed as a question of systems: who has Patriot, who has SAMP/T, who is sending what. The guests on this podcast keep moving the question somewhere less comfortable, to the number of interceptors behind each launcher and the physics of the thing coming in.
Against a missile that can change its trajectory mid-flight, one interceptor is a guess. The United States would fire several. Ukraine often cannot. That single constraint explains more about Ukrainian air defence performance than any comparison of system specifications, and it does not improve when a new battery arrives without the magazines to feed it.
The other half of the problem is offensive. If you cannot reliably intercept the missile, you go after the launcher. Ukraine knows roughly where Russian launchers sit, in forests with underground shelter, and still cannot catch them, because a launcher is only exposed in the minutes it stands up to fire.
Drawn from Episode 14
Rob Lee on why a single Patriot interceptor against an Iskander 9M723 is often a 50% guess, why SAMP/T, factory strikes and Firepoint offer no quick fix, and Dmytro Putiata on knowing where Russian launchers hide but being unable to catch them.
Iskander, KN-23 and S-400 ground-attack missiles can land seconds after the alarm. Rob Lee and Dmytro Putiata on North Korean launchers under the Moscow Military District, the Patriot shortage, and why Starlink-connected Hornet drones could hunt Iskander launchers within 500 km of the border.
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Ukraine Military History Institute